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LOVE IT OR HATE IT, BUT FOR THE RIGHT 
REASONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE NEW 
HAVEN SCHOOL’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
Hengameh Saberi* 
Abstract: This Article presents a novel understanding of pragmatism in 
the New Haven School of international law. The New Haven Jurispru-
dence is wrapped in layers of mystification and the scant accounts of its 
pragmatism in the literature are either entirely mistaken or only partially 
helpful, betray a vernacular or truncated understanding of pragmatism, 
and fail to engage with the internal, epistemic structure of the policy-
oriented jurisprudence. In response, this Article uncovers a contradictory 
form of foundationalist pragmatism in the Yale Jurisprudence in a peculiar 
relationship between its contextualist and problem-solving promises and 
its unreflective normative commitments to a set of postulated values of 
human dignity. In doing so, it foregrounds a “foundationalist antifounda-
tionalism” and its crippling impact on the pragmatist promises of policy-
oriented jurisprudence. Against the worn-out accusations of the New Ha-
ven Jurisprudence of U.S. imperialism or disguised affinity with natural 
law, understanding its foundationalist pragmatism offers a new apprecia-
tion of both the genius of Yale’s policy-oriented approach and the prom-
ises of pragmatism for policy thinking in international law. 
Introduction 
 In 1971, Richard Falk—himself an astute student of the New Ha-
ven School of international law (NHS)—predicted that if by 2010 the 
world would have overcome “the fundamental challenges of war, pov-
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erty, pollution, and oppression,” an historian seeking to “recreate the 
intellectual roots of such a positive outcome” could not hope to do bet-
ter than to explicate the “clarity of vision, seriousness of commitment, 
and extent of impact . . .” of the life and work of Professor Myres 
McDougal.1 With 2011 already behind us, the historian is hardly so 
lucky as to be asked for an account of the intellectual roots of a world 
without war, poverty, pollution, and oppression. Despite this, Professor 
Myres McDougal’s place in the history of American international law, as 
Falk aptly put it, “tower[s] so far above his contemporaries as to be vir-
tually invisible.”2 
 Like most things in the altitudes of invisibility, however, the policy-
oriented approach to international law that was born and flourished in 
New Haven3 remains, seven decades later, persistently enveloped in 
layers of mystification. In its own time, it lived a life of celebrity scholar-
ship—attracting some and repelling many others—in which fiery rebut-
tals trumped meaningful engagements with critics. In its afterlife, it 
earned little more than either overwhelmingly negative or positive ac-
counts of what it was not, or underwhelming appraisal and apprecia-
tion of what it was. Reactions to the NHS’s policy approach run the 
gamut from critiques that target its theoretical inadequacies or follies 
and the threat posed to the rule of law if policy and law were to be so 
closely integrated,4 to laudatory commendations of the NHS’s own as-
sertive stance as a comprehensive jurisprudence for a new world public 
order of human dignity,5 to enchantment with the NHS’s methodo-
                                                                                                                      
1 Richard Falk, Myres S. McDougal: Pioneer for the Year 2010, 1 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 
13, 15–16 (1971). 
2 Id. at 16. 
3 See generally Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Pol-
icy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943) [hereinafter McDougal 
& Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy]. Legal Education and Public Policy is the first 
collaborative work of Lasswell and McDougal, which in effect set the groundwork for a new 
policy-oriented jurisprudence. 
4 See discussion infra Part I. 
5 For examples of such accounts that address the NHS’s general jurisprudence, with-
out discussing specific doctrinal debates, see, for example, John Morton Moore, Prolegome-
non to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 Va. L. Rev. 662, 688 
(1968), who suggests that the jurisprudential canvass into the Lasswell-McDougal project is 
among the most rewarding endeavors in legal thought, and Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven 
School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 Yale Stud. 
World Pub. Ord. 1, 46 (1974), who argues that the NHS “has aided contemporary schol-
ars and decisionmakers alike to construct adequate tools for the study of the interrelations 
of law and the world social process.” 
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logical heresy of weaving policy into the fabric of law without actually 
adopting that methodology in any identifiable form or substance.6 
 This Article aims to break through the by-now solidified walls of 
misperception around Yale’s policy-oriented jurisprudence, dispel 
some of the accepted wisdom about its foundations and nature, and 
present a more nuanced, dispassionate, and plausible understanding of 
its epistemological commitments and methodological claims. For all 
their differences, critics and admirers of the New Haven Jurisprudence 
agree about at least one fundamental assumption: that New Haven’s 
policy-oriented approach and its avowed antifoundationalism are con-
sistent with the teachings of American pragmatism. This Article chal-
lenges the accepted wisdom about pragmatism in the NHS and offers a 
more accurate reading of its antifoundationalism. It does so because 
the peculiar relationship between pragmatism and human dignity in 
the NHS not only defined the fate of its career during and after the 
Cold War, but continues to bear crucial implications for the life of in-
ternational law in the United States. A fresh and accurate understand-
ing of the pragmatist and policy-oriented jurisprudence of the interna-
tional law of human dignity, therefore, through its historical 
significance, opens up new avenues for a realistic assessment of interna-
tional law’s vocation, limits, and potential in the twenty-first century. 
 As any cursory review of American legal thought confirms, Profes-
sor McDougal and Harold Lasswell’s collaborative project transcends 
international law into the wider space of jurisprudence, introducing a 
configurative and sophisticated theoretical framework to advance hu-
man dignity in a free society.7 History, however, evidently had a different 
course plotted for the success and reception of Yale’s policy science ju-
risprudence. The Lasswell-McDougal project is known as “the first 
American attempt to conceive of . . . lawyering—legal teaching, re-
search, practice and decision-making—as an overtly political endeavor.”8 
Pedagogical reconstruction was, therefore, the first platform on which 
the NHS hoped to construct an image of the politically conscious lawyer 
                                                                                                                      
6 This view is best reflected in the general, but unenunciated, understanding of the 
NHS as an all-encompassing, oceanic movement that has altered the discipline such that it 
is simply no longer possible to think of international law in pre-McDougalian terms. 
7 See generally Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a 
Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy (1992) [hereinafter McDougal & 
Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society]. 
8 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 164 (1995). 
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as a lawyer of human dignity.9 The American system of legal education, 
however, was not persuaded to train lawyers as policy scientists in order 
to advance the normative goals of human dignity or universal democ-
racy.10 Nor was international law—the discipline the Lasswell-McDougal 
collaboration in effect spent its entire career to reform—enticed by the 
configurative methodology of policy science. In fact, as will be outlined 
in Part I below, contemporaneous reactions to the NHS’s interdiscipli-
nary project ranged from agnosticism to outright rejection, rendering 
the NHS the most visible, but ultimately the least influential, mid-
twentieth century project of disciplinary renewal.11 
 Later interdisciplinary proposals for an international law geared 
toward post-Cold War challenges and opportunities were also not 
aligned with Yale’s policy-oriented methodology. One would have ex-
pected the post-Cold War reemergence of enthusiasm about the poten-
tial of political science to enrich international law to exhibit, beyond 
reverence for empirical research, a more meaningful methodological 
affinity with or understanding of the elaborate application of policy 
science in the New Haven Jurisprudence. Aside from an implicit regard 
for the pioneering work of McDougal, however, the international rela-
tions rescue mission lacked the sophistication of Yale’s configurative 
and multidisciplinary approach, remaining content to set up interna-
tional law with quantitative ambitions.12 This was, after all, “a new gen-
eration of interdisciplinary scholarship.”13 The other feasible suspect to 
                                                                                                                      
9 Hence, the first Lasswell-McDougal work was devoted to a comprehensive plan for 
legal education. See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 
206. 
10 For the best account of the failure of the NHS’s educational program, see Laura 
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, at 184–85 (2001), which details the opposi-
tion to the Lasswell-McDougal proposal in the general perception of policy science as be-
ing too costly and academic, and just elitist. Interestingly, McDougal himself blamed the 
failure of educational institutions to adopt the policy-oriented approach on timing, rather 
than institutional constraints: 
We got much more attention than we wanted before we wanted it . . . . We 
thought we’d have several years to formulate the stuff and write it up before 
we got too much attention, but we got too much success too quickly to serve 
intellectual purposes, and then we got the reaction. 
Id. at 185 (quoting an interview with McDougal). 
11 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall 
of International Law 1870–1960, at 475 (2002). 
12 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998) (ex-
ploring the intersection of international law and international relations and specifically 
the use of international relations theory to solve various international legal problems). 
13 Id. at 393. 
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carry the NHS’s torch would have been Critical Legal Studies (CLS) or 
its offspring, which share to an equal degree McDougal’s skepticism 
about the law’s autonomy.14 But this shared epistemological view about 
the law and its indeterminacy provides a very thin genealogical relation 
between CLS and the NHS, considering that CLS would cringe both at 
New Haven’s commitment to a scientific approach to decision-making 
and at the significant, overdetermining role of its normative fidelity to 
human dignity for legal outcomes.15 
 Even through its brightest chance for resurrection or comprehen-
sion in the twenty-first century as “a ‘new’ New Haven School,”16 the 
NHS has been taken merely to inspire a pluralistic platform against the 
reductionism of rational choice theory,17 to delineate the complexity of 
diverse world public orders in a new age,18 or to question, in a way that 
does little to enhance our understanding of the NHS, the Lasswell-
                                                                                                                      
14 See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal 
Profession 201–02 (1993) (suggesting that the seeds of CLS could be found in Lasswell 
and McDougal’s first collaborative work). 
15 See, e.g., James Boyle, Ideals and Things: Legal Scholarship and the Prison-House of Lan-
guage, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 327, 343 (1985) (“To claim that one can inject a universal value 
(‘human dignity’) into an avowedly means-end technique is a contradiction in terms. For 
this to become one of the dominant approaches to international law is a travesty.”). 
McDougal himself also spoke of the differences between the NHS and CLS: 
We seek more emphasis upon deliberate creation and appreciation of policy 
than most prior framers of jurisprudence and we recognize the need for a 
comprehensive, integrated set of values to achieve this emphasis. It is here 
that we differ from the Critical Legal Studies people . . . [W]e try to be con-
structive as well as destructive. 
Letter from Myres S. McDougal to Neil Duxbury (Feb. 14, 1990), quoted in Duxbury, supra 
note 8, at 194–95 n.189. 
16 Lauren E. Baer & Stephen M. Ruckman, Foreward to Symposium, The “New” New Ha-
ven School: International Law—Past, Present & Future, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 299, 299 (2007). 
17 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l 
L. 301, 305–11 (2007) (linking the Lasswell-McDougal emphasis on law as social process to 
Robert Cover’s legal pluralism and finding its synthesis in Harold Koh’s theory of transna-
tional legal process); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the 
New Haven School of International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 393, 396–98, 408–10 (2007) 
(comparing the old NHS’s stance against the realists and positivists of its time to the New 
NHS’s invocation of bottom-up rulemaking against contemporary neo-sovereigntists); 
Dakota S. Rudesill, Note, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational Military Technology 
and the Duty of Care Under Laws of War, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 517, 543–44 (2007) (tangentially 
referring to the old NHS while tackling norm diffusion in the laws of war to fit into the 
New NHS symposium theme). 
18 See Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and Normative 
Friction, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 331, 359–61 (2007) (arguing for the conceptual complexity of 
world public order and suggesting ways the NHS can build on some of its original insights 
to capture the new realities of the time). 
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McDougal quest for scientific precision in legal decision-making as the 
specific product of its time and space.19 An amalgam of heterogeneous 
projects, the “new” New Haven School reaches out to different parts of 
the proverbial elephant in the dark, to pay respect to a shared geo-
graphical locale, rather than to find inspiration in the epistemological, 
methodological, or normative insights of the Lasswell-McDougal pro-
ject. 
 If international law as a whole in the United States was not en-
lightened by the New Haven Jurisprudence, why, then, does McDou-
gal’s policy-oriented approach warrant a new reading? Two reasons 
connected to the internal structure of policy-oriented jurisprudence 
not only justify, but demand, a new assessment of this mid-twentieth 
century genius of U.S. international legal thinking. First, the NHS’s 
policy approach to international law is symbolic of how Americans pre-
dominantly engage with (or disengage from) international law with a 
more flexible, policy-conscious, contextualist, and problem-solving atti-
tude. In general, the association of American theories of international 
law with the Yale approach often has overestimating undertones that 
are both negative and positive. On the negative side, Yale—and thus 
any form of policy analysis, as opposed to purely legalistic arguments— 
is blamed for reflecting an ill disposition for easily breaking the law in 
the name of balancing conflicting policies.20 On the positive side, even 
its detractors, who deny it the exalted status of “jurisprudence,” ac-
knowledge that “[o]ne can hardly participate in modern international 
law scholarship without a background in ‘policy science.’”21 A more 
profound understanding of the internal structure, epistemological 
claims and function, and methodological and normative commitments 
of the NHS is required to reject the simplistic association of this policy-
oriented approach with U.S. foreign policy interests to bring about the 
demise of international law. Likewise, given that even the “new” New 
                                                                                                                      
19 Rebecca M. Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Environmental Law: A 
Process-Oriented Inquiry into Sustainable Development, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 363, 366 (2007). 
20 See, e.g., Brad Roth, Bending the Law, Breaking It, or Developing It? The United States and 
the Humanitarian Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, in United States Hegemony and the 
Foundations of International Law 232, 249–50 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 
2003) (“At its worst, the policy-oriented approach equates law with justice as interpreted by 
the strong.”). Recognizing the policy-oriented approach as neither uniquely American nor 
merely a divisive apology to justify U.S. foreign policy interests, Roth still believes that it 
“remains a controversial mode of legal analysis, especially among those who seek to main-
tain a critical perspective on U.S. actions.” Id. at 250. 
21 Brian Leiter, Is There an ‘American’ Jurisprudence?, 17 Oxford J.L. Stud. 367, 369 
(1997). 
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Haven School barely resembles McDougal’s policy science except in 
geographic name, against the fantastic and overblown description of 
the NHS as a gateway to “modern international law scholarship,” a 
more realistic account of McDougal’s legacy for international law is 
long overdue. 
 Understanding that legacy is beyond the ambit of this Article.22 
But to understand that invisible yet extraordinary and long-enduring 
impact, as opposed to the banal visibility often afforded the NHS, it is 
first crucial to cast the principal epistemic claims of the NHS—those 
suggesting the influence of pragmatism—in a new light. These two 
constitutive pragmatist claims are contextualism and problem-solving 
orientation. To grasp their origin, function, and implications for Yale’s 
international law of human dignity, one must properly locate McDou-
gal’s intellectual pedigree. 
 Widely held and deeply ingrained in international lawyers’ con-
sciousness, but never methodically delineated,23 is a belief that the NHS 
has deep roots in American Legal Realism.24 Upon further examina-
tion, however, “McDougal’s realist sentiments” irretrievably give way to 
the force of Lasswell’s policy science.25 Acknowledging the exceedingly 
strong and determinative influence of Lasswellian policy science on the 
New Haven Jurisprudence, compared to currently unexplored traces of 
Legal Realism, is the long neglected key that will open new avenues for 
a better understanding of the real place and disciplinary legacy of the 
NHS in international law. 
 How so? As I will argue, there is a peculiar interaction between the 
scientific and normative commitments in the New Haven Jurispru-
dence, in which the strenuous standards of empirical analysis it pre-
scribes (or any other form of inquiry for that matter) do not apply to 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Hengameh Saberi, The New Haven School’s Soliloquy: Banal Visibility and In-
visible Impact (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library). Here I suggest that in fact the NHS, through its interaction with its contempora-
neous mainstream international law discipline, induced a new consciousness about “policy 
thinking” that still haunts international legal discourse in the United States. 
23 For a notable exception, see generally William Morison, Myres S. McDougal and Twenti-
eth-Century Jurisprudence: A Comparative Essay, in Toward World Order and Human Dignity 
3 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976). As the only extensive comparative 
jurisprudential study of the NHS, Morison’s essay reads McDougal against a number of twen-
tieth-century schools of thought and not merely Legal Realism. As such, his analysis of the 
NHS’s realist roots is theme selective and, inevitably, limited in scope. 
24 Cf. Duxbury, supra note 8, at 170 (stating that Lasswell and McDougal found legal 
realism to be inadequate and thus attempted to move American jurisprudence away from 
the traditional methods of legal realism). 
25 Id. at 167–68. 
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the normative values of human dignity. Human dignity, therefore, takes 
the form of an overarching and determinative element in legal deci-
sion-making, while its substance consists of a set of homegrown value 
postulates that reflect the parochial normative worldview of the New 
Haven masters. The form and substance of human dignity, defined as 
such, bear significant consequences for the fundamental epistemic 
claims of the policy-oriented approach—the claims that putatively make 
the NHS a genus of pragmatism. What remains of the pragmatist prom-
ises of contextualism and problem-solving orientation, in the face of 
what ultimately is a foundational faith in the essence and determining 
role of human dignity, is no more than a semblance of pragmatism, if 
one recognizes antifoundationalism as the cardinal epistemic building 
block of pragmatism. New Haven’s antifoundationalism, in the final 
analysis, is not without foundations of its own. This foundationalist anti-
foundationalism becomes not only the hallmark of policy-oriented ju-
risprudence, aligning it with the foreign policy interests of the leader of 
the free world, but also the explanatory force behind international 
law’s reaction to the role of policy versus law for many years to come. 
 To make sense of New Haven’s foundationalist pragmatism—a 
contradiction by nature with grand consequences—one should flex the 
commonly held assumption about the force of realist jurisprudence on 
Yale’s collaborative renewal project in international law. The Lasswell-
McDougal project sought a new and receptive disciplinary home in in-
ternational law for Lasswell’s policy science and a counterpart for the 
policy scientist of democracy in the international lawyer of human dig-
nity. Reading the foundationalist antifoundationalism of Yale under the 
shade of Lasswell’s pedigree affords a breeze of sympathy toward 
McDougal’s vision for a policy-oriented international law, vindicating it 
from the unsophisticated accusations of legitimization and hasty cri-
tiques that have failed to follow or engage with the internal logic of the 
New Haven Jurisprudence. 
 To offer a new understanding of New Haven’s pragmatism for an 
international law of human dignity, this Article proceeds as follows. In 
Part I, I map the discipline’s reactions to the Lasswell-McDougal project 
to illustrate that, regardless of the nature of objections, the literature has 
unanimously entertained an external critique of the Yale approach 
without a trace of attention to its epistemic claims and a critical assess-
ment of their function and success in delivering what they promise. Part 
II reviews the sketchy accounts of New Haven’s pragmatism in the litera-
ture and suggests that they lack a philosophical understanding of prag-
matism, and thus adopt, at best a truncated, and at worst a vernacular, 
usage of the term. The centerpiece of the argument advanced here, 
2012] Pragmatism and the NHS’s International Law of Human Dignity 67 
Parts III and IV, instead take contextualism and problem-solving orien-
tation as the two core claims of the New Haven Jurisprudence that bear 
significant epistemological implications for policy-oriented approach 
and re-assess their success in light of the normative commitments of the 
New Haven masters. By dissecting the function of New Haven’s contex-
tualism and problem-solving orientation and their interaction with the 
central role of human dignity in legal decision-making, I aim to fore-
ground and make sense of the NHS’s foundationalist antifoundational-
ism or pragmatism. Part V concludes the argument. 
 Rather than intend to discover the “real” New Haven Jurispru-
dence, or propose an affirmative account of what a plausibly pragmatist 
international law of human dignity (or any other normative agenda) 
ought to look like,26 this Article takes apart some of the fundamental, 
but misguided and misleading, understandings of Yale’s policy ap-
proach, of pragmatism, and ultimately of policy thinking in interna-
tional law. As the existing literature bears evidence, no account of the 
career of the Lasswell-McDougal project and its legacy for international 
law would take off successfully amid the fog that still surrounds the ep-
istemic and methodological tenets of policy science. This is neither 
about saving Yale’s policy-oriented approach nor about venerating the 
tradition of pragmatism, but rather a first attempt at taking stock of 
what really went on in the Lasswell-McDougal heresy in order to estab-
lish solid ground for a more accurate understanding of how this mid-
twentieth century revolutionary project of disciplinary renewal speaks 
to us today. 
I. New Haven’s Policy-Oriented International Law and the 
Panorama of Agnosticism 
 In its own time, the policy-oriented approach of the NHS faced 
general resistance. This resistance at first appears to derive from a 
commonly shared source of disciplinary anxiety among international 
lawyers of the time about the methodological novelty so passionately 
advocated by Lasswell and McDougal. Under the New Haven account, 
international law faced a choice between, on the one hand, a multi-
disciplinary project of renewal with a sophisticated scientific apparatus 
and clear normative commitments, and on the other hand, stagnation 
and a naïve hope in the autonomy of the rule of law.27 
                                                                                                                      
26 The latter project would be a worthwhile endeavor and certainly deserves its own 
space. That will not, however, be here. 
27 See, e.g., McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 237. 
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 This picture, however, is too general and too vague to reflect the 
complete story of the discipline’s reception of a policy-oriented inter-
national law of human dignity. The ill fate of the democratic science of 
international law envisioned by the NHS may be attributed, in varying 
degrees, to a wide variety of factors, such as: institutional constraints, 
unfavorable timing, McDougal’s complex language and style, interna-
tional lawyers’ impatience with New Haven’s scientific accuracy and 
technical vocabulary, agnosticism about the practical value of employ-
ing scientific language, resistance against a disciplinary renewal gener-
ally perceived as either unnecessary or incomprehensible, anxiety 
about the certainty of the law and the professional image of the lawyer 
giving in to the professional identity of the policy scientist of democ-
racy, and a mutual sense of alienation between the old and the new. 
 An historiographical attempt to understand the career of the NHS 
must weigh all these explanations and possibly discover more. But the 
map of contemporaneous reactions to McDougal’s policy-oriented her-
esy here has a different purpose. It presents a synopsis of what was in 
debate in order to illustrate what was not. Agnostic reactions to McDou-
gal’s proposal, in all their variations, focused on an external critique to 
target its ideological implications, its view of law and power, and its 
complex style and language.28 As manifested by this map, none took any 
interest in the internal, epistemic structure of the New Haven Jurispru-
dence. 
 The map below sketching popular skepticism against the NHS is 
admittedly simplified to some degree. Any effort to thread various in-
terpretations of the methodological renewal of the NHS inevitably dis-
regards some nuances in the interest of making sense of a common dis-
ciplinary spirit. In fact, the prevalent strands of skepticism about the 
New Haven Jurisprudence never quite converged on what they found 
most problematic with the policy-oriented approach; nor did the New 
Haven masters take the various objections they faced seriously enough 
to engage in a dynamic and linear series of debates and methodically 
classify the arguments of their skeptics. This lack of genuine communi-
cation may explain why all the negative reactions to the policy-oriented 
approach remained external to the NHS’s epistemic structure. 
                                                                                                                      
28 See discussion infra Parts I.A.–C. 
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A. Policy-Orientation and Legitimization 
 The first set of critiques of the methodological renewal and norma-
tive commitment of the NHS derives from blanket skepticism about the 
political orientation and intellectual independence of the New Haven 
masters. By focusing on the American character of their policy approach 
to legal decision-making, these readings of Lasswell and McDougal be-
gin with an assumption about New Haven’s partiality for U.S. domi-
nance during the Cold War. These assumptions are specifically illus-
trated in different aspects of the configurative jurisprudence in which 
policy considerations must determine legal outcomes. Though not al-
ways to an equal degree, the skepticism appears to be cast over the mere 
plausibility of the scientific claims and the possibility of consensus over 
the specific normative commitments of the New Haven Jurisprudence 
on the one hand, and the particular application of those scientific 
methods and the interpretation of the accompanying normative com-
mitments on the other. 
 Some simply remain unconvinced by the Yale School’s claims to 
scientific objectivity. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the 
plausibility of scientific objectivity or the failure of McDougal and his 
associates to apply those standards to actual legal problems is truly in 
question when, for instance, Leo Gross speaks of “the policy-science 
approach to international law which disguises policy in a pseudoscientific 
apparatus of procedures for determining what the law is.”29 At the center 
of the scientific teachings of policy sciences to promote objectivity lie 
the “maintenance of clarity in observational standpoint,” “[t]he delimi-
tation of an appropriate focus of inquiry,” and the “performance of 
intellectual tasks.”30 These three principles aim to define precisely the 
relationship of the scholar to the legal problem at hand—the question 
of who is analyzing what and how.31 The identification of the scholar or 
policy scientist with a particular class, culture, and nation-state signifi-
cantly impacts the way she formulates the question and seeks the an-
swers. Even more important is the professional role the international 
                                                                                                                      
29 Leo Gross, Editorial Comment, Hans Kelsen, 67 Am. J. Int’l L. 491, 499 (1973) (em-
phasis added). 
30 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & Michael W. Reisman, Theories About Inter-
national Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int’l L. 188, 199–200 (1968) 
[hereinafter McDougal et al., Theories About International Law]. 
31 Frederick Samson Tipson, Consolidating World Public Order: The American Study 
of International Law and the Work of Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, 1906–
1976, at 44 (May 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file 
with Alderman Library, University of Virginia). 
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law scholar adopts, either consciously or unconsciously. McDougal, 
Lasswell, and Reisman contrast the “scholarly observer” with the “active 
decision-maker,”32 a distinction that, despite being oversimplified,33 is 
nevertheless a testament to the importance of defining a precise obser-
vational standpoint in order to maintain objectivity. 
 The oversimplification of a divide between scholarly pondering 
and decision-making is even more evident when one considers that, 
within each category, the questions of contentment with status quo or a 
desire for change—and, for scholars, the task of accommodating an 
intellectual, social, and political orientation through a congenial juris-
prudential approach—complicate the clarification of the observational 
standpoint far more than the policy sciences appear to recognize. To be 
sure, McDougal clearly recognizes that his own specific vocational, sty-
listic, community, national and international affiliations shape and con-
strain his vision, and that distinguishing between individual inclinations 
and common interests of mankind is a matter of exercise and persis-
tence.34 Such a clarification demands careful psychological self-analysis. 
Identifying the footprints of culture, class, and personality in Lasswell’s 
schema, and defining a particular professional role with respect to the 
analysis of the problem under investigation, requires a stronger faith in 
psychology than lawyers generally find persuasive. 
 Even if, in principle, psychology and observation of the self were 
granted the scrutinizing power that Lasswell recommends to the policy 
scientist and that McDougal borrows for the international lawyer, Lass-
well and McDougal’s application of the test of rationality to their own 
work and their resistance to the impacts of class, personality and cul-
ture were less than successful. In fact, some sympathetic readers find 
that the alleged objectivity in observational standpoint falls short not in 
the usefulness of the concept itself, but in the New Haven masters’ 
overestimation of their own rationality in adhering to that first element 
of objectivity.35 McDougal’s reliance on “reasonableness,” the “wider 
shaping and sharing” of values, and “minimum world public order” as 
working criteria to deduce specific desired results from general princi-
ples such as “community policy” and “human dignity” poses a difficult 
                                                                                                                      
32 McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 199. 
33 See, e.g., William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 285–89 
(1973). 
34 See Myres S. McDougal, Remarks, in The Law of the Sea: A New Geneva Confer-
ence 179, 179–80 (L. Alexander ed., 1972), cited in Tipson, supra note 31, at 232. 
35 See, e.g., Tipson, supra note 31, at 235–37. 
2012] Pragmatism and the NHS’s International Law of Human Dignity 71 
challenge to his claim of rationality and his extensive survey of trends 
and conditioning factors in different contexts.36 
 Take, for instance, McDougal’s justification of American hydrogen 
bomb tests based on “established community expectations.”37 The 
community expectations favoring the unrestricted right of the United 
States to conduct a series of hydrogen bomb tests derive from three fac-
tors: the absence of an absolute resolution between mare liberum and 
mare clausum claims; the universal right of defense against external se-
curity threats, which extends to nuclear testing in preparation for self-
defense; and the vote of the Trusteeship Council of the 1947 Trustee-
ship Agreement governing the American control of the Marshall Is-
lands, which recognized the right to nuclear testing as an extension of 
the Trustee’s authority.38 The quick path of reasoning from “commu-
nity expectations” to the specific, undisputed right of the United States 
to nuclear testing runs afoul of contextual-orientation methodology 
with respect to the absence of empirical evidence regarding general 
community expectations and the opinions of world elites.39 Consider-
ing that McDougal and his associates start from an anarchical assump-
tion about international relations to make a case for the seriousness of 
security threats, an appeal to “community expectations” —including 
the opinion of those with no interest in the “wider shaping and shar-
ing” of values and those who stand in opposition to the “minimum 
world public order” —would be meaningless.40 One also must wonder 
about McDougal’s reliance on the vote of the Trusteeship Council; 
elsewhere he is clear that “the presumed congruence of formal and 
actual authority of intergovernmental organizations may or may not be 
sustained by the concurrence of expectations necessary to justify a 
claim of actual constitutive authority.”41 Here, an “effective decision” 
overrides an “authoritative decision.”42 With that said, given the subjec-
                                                                                                                      
 
36 See id. at 235–36. 
37 Robert Wood, Public Order and Political Integration in Contemporary International Theory, 
14 Va. J. Int’l L. 423, 437 (1974); see Myres S. McDougal & Norbert Schlei, The Hydrogen 
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648, 679 (1955) [hereinaf-
ter McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests]. 
38 Wood, supra note 37, at 437–38; see McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, su-
pra note 37, at 650, 678. 
39 Wood, supra note 37, at 437–38. 
40 See McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, supra note 37, at 650. 
41 Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1 
The Future of the International Legal Order 73, 80 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. 
Falk eds., 1969). 
42 Wood, supra note 37, at 438. Similar challenges have been posed to other works of 
McDougal and his associates that apply general principles of “reasonableness,” “commu-
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tivity of independent states’ determination of perceived threats, it is 
curious that McDougal expects such determinations to pass the test of 
“reasonableness” so smoothly. 
 It is, then, the speedy descent from the high ground of general 
principles to the valley of “self-evident” results that betrays sheer disre-
gard for detailed contextual analysis and, understandably if not justifia-
bly, gives rise to suspicion of McDougal’s uncritical acceptance of the 
views of the policy elite.43 To one commentator, “the impact of these 
implicit normative premises [of human dignity] on McDougal’s think-
ing about substantive issues, despite his self-conscious concern with val-
ues in the formulation of his conceptual framework, constitutes a strik-
ing confirmation of the subtle impact of underlying values in all 
intellectual endeavor.”44 A more scathing review goes so far as to re-
duce the entire scientific and normative enterprise of the policy sci-
ences to no more than the crude material interest of the United States: 
“Law is policy. Policy is human dignity. Human dignity is fostered in the 
long run by the success of American foreign policy. Therefore, law is 
the handmaiden of the national interest of the United States.”45 
                                                                                                                     
 Stanley Hoffmann considers the problem to result from McDou-
gal’s definition of the values of human dignity in a manner overlapping 
with the American national interest in the face of Communism.46 This 
critique is neither against the proposed (pseudo)scientific recommen-
dations of policy sciences, nor against its normative commitment to 
human dignity per se, but rather against the precise way in which these 
 
nity expectations,” etc., to secure the interest of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. 
Tipson argues that this inconsistency is present in several of McDougal's works. See Tipson, 
supra note 31, at 235–36. For examples of these inconsistencies, see generally, Myres S. 
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 597, 603 (1963) 
[hereinafter McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine]; Myres S. McDougal & Richard M. 
Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiated 
Solution, 60 Am. J. Int’l L. 671 (1966); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia 
and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1968) 
[hereinafter McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations]. 
43 See Oran Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. 
McDougal, 66 Am. J. Int’l L. 60, 74–75 (1972) (“McDougal has leaned towards a somewhat 
uncritical acceptance of the views of the American ‘establishment’ on a number of specific 
issues in the field of international relations.”). 
44 Id. at 75. 
45 Stanley Anderson, A Critique of Professor Myres S. McDougal’s Doctrine of Interpretation by 
Major Purposes, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 378, 382 (1963). 
46 Stanley Hoffmann et al., Mild Reformist and Mild Revolutionary, 24 J. Int’l Aff. 118, 
120 (1970). 
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goals are defined and applied to any number of particular cases to de-
termine outcomes.47 
 In what is perhaps sacrilegious treatment of policy sciences’ democ-
ratic commitments, some consider the Yale School’s application of con-
textual-orientation methodology and the Soviet doctrine of co-existence 
to be essentially two sides of the same coin.48 Equally repugnant to the 
praxis-attentiveness of policy science is the haziness in McDougal’s dis-
tinction between the professional roles of scholar and policy-maker, and 
a call for intellectual or theoretical purity. In Hoffmann’s words: 
[The scholar’s] primary duty, in our discipline as in all others, 
is to seek knowledge and understanding for their own sake. 
This implies that the main purpose of research should not be 
“policy scientism.” The fighting of crusades, the desire to ad-
vise policy-makers, or the scholar’s dedication to national or 
international causes can and perhaps even should be the occa-
sion, but they should not be the purpose, of theoretical re-
search.49 
 In essence, Hoffmann applauds the definition of observational 
standpoint in the interest of knowledge for the sake of knowledge.50 
Hankering after pure knowledge, however, only turns upside down the 
contribution of generations of American social thinkers—from prag-
matists to the progressives of the early and mid-twentieth century, in-
cluding policy scientists. McDougal’s clarification of observational 
standpoint does not detach theory from praxis or knowledge from ac-
tion. Rather, as unrealistic a demand as it is, it is meant to make the 
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. 
48 E.g., Leon Lipson, International Law, in 8 Handbook of Political Science: Inter-
national Politics 415, 430–34 (Fred Greenstein & Nelson Polsby eds., 1975), cited in 
Tipson, supra note 31, at 233–34. 
49 Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations 10 
(1960). Hoffmann continues: “[T]he distinction between ‘what is worth knowing intellec-
tually and what is useful for practice,’ between understanding and doctoring, remains 
essential, both for practical and for ethical reasons.” Id. Richard Falk, in the interest of 
developing a theory of international law, also suggests that the jurisdiction of the theorist 
and the adversary be separated: 
[R]ecognizing the difficulty of making engineering applications of high-order 
legal abstractions, . . . the theorist [ought to] refrain from participation in ad-
versary arenas (and, ideally, . . . an adversary [should] refrain from entering 
scholarly arenas), or at least that the nature of participation in legal debate 
[should] be clearly labeled. 
Richard A. Falk, The Status of Law in International Society 17 (1970). 
50 See Hoffman, supra note 49, at 10. 
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scholar aware, vis-à-vis her inquiry, of her integrated identity and identi-
fication assumptions, and the particular professional position she takes. 
In fact, McDougal’s clarification is intended to help achieve the ever-
desired objectivity and scientific knowledge at the service of practical 
problems. It is one thing to point to the illusory nature of such a level 
of objectivity, but an entirely different thing to blame McDougal’s par-
tiality to U.S. national interests on this straddling of the scholarly and 
decision-making positions.51 
 The divergent characters and intellectual orientation of Lasswell 
and McDougal provide another basis for criticism of a credible stand-
point in their collaboration.52 Behind the New Haven Jurisprudence, 
stands Lasswell—a scientific-minded, “insatiable” pioneer in “total 
comprehension” of social affairs, who is called “the ideal of the omnis-
cient scientist” —and McDougal— “the ideal of the irrebuttable advo-
cate, the tireless persuader or persistent proselyte,” who never misses an 
opportunity to channel solutions for any problems to the cause of hu-
man dignity as he defines it.53 The dual nature of policy sciences reflect 
the differences of two minds or two temperaments, that of a scientist 
and that of an advocate.54 Under this reading, the advocacy side of 
Yale’s configurative jurisprudence blunts its scientific edge because it 
either provides direction or manipulates results to fit the NHS’s desired 
outcomes.55 Thus, in plain disregard of the postulated normative values 
advocated by policy sciences, objectivity claims lose credibility in light of 
the policy-oriented approach’s overestimation of its own objectivity. 
 In sum, whether it is the adulterated scientific objectivity of policy 
sciences, its masters’ conflated observational standpoints (despite their 
                                                                                                                      
51 Richard Falk, in fact, finds McDougal’s insistence on policy explication to have a 
necessarily radicalizing impact, which disqualifies international lawyers as mere profes-
sional technicians, particularly at the service of governments and corporations. See Richard 
Falk, The Place of Policy in International Law, 2 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 29, 32 (1972). 
52 See Tipson, supra note 31, at 236. 
53 See id. at 236–37. Lasswell himself refers to this difference: 
Luckily our preferred frames of thought, though complementary, are not the 
same. McDougal loves verbal combat, especially in the frame of a prescriptive 
system and an appellate court. So far as I am concerned, most combat is bor-
ing and time-wasting. My preference is inquiry into factual causes and conse-
quences. We are aware of these differences and deliberately exploit the intel-
lectual tensions that result. 
Harold Lasswell, In Collaboration with McDougal, 1 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 17, 19 (1971). 
54 See Tipson, supra note 31, at 237. 
55 But see Anderson, supra note 45, at 382–83 (arguing that “Professor McDougal’s ap-
proach is coherent, and is not simply the intrusion of advocacy into scholarship,” but nev-
ertheless going on to reject it as an extra-juristic system). 
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recommendations for defining a credible standpoint), the centrality of 
human dignity in determining legal outcomes, the definition of human 
dignity in a way to converge with American foreign policy interests, or a 
disharmonious collaboration of two opposing personalities, the first 
group of critiques follows a straightforward explanation and views the 
policy-oriented international law as a project devised to maintain and 
legitimize the U.S. national interest. 
B. Policy-Orientation and the Reduction of Law to Power 
 The second series of critiques concerns the project’s broad defini-
tion of the social processes that define law. These objections run the 
gamut from direct opposition to debasing law with politics, to a signifi-
cantly more sophisticated and widespread challenge to the actual appli-
cation of the configurative methods of a policy-oriented international 
law. The blanket rejection of the intrusion of politics and policy into law 
came either from international lawyers avowedly associated with positiv-
ism or from commentators within the neighboring discipline of interna-
tional relations who placed too much hope in a romanticized concep-
tion of law as taming the political realities of interstate relations. 
 To those associated with a positivist foundation of law, the NHS 
inherited “all the faults of American ‘legal realism.’”56 In McDougal’s 
refutation of legal normativity, law, as they saw it, was no more than a 
“euphemism.”57 International law, in comparison to other fields of law, 
is more susceptible to politicization and yields more easily to arbitrary 
interpretations. Legal realism’s strike, therefore, as reflected in the pol-
icy-oriented approach, was an existential threat that sacrificed law for 
propaganda: “Other more hardy areas of the law may have been able to 
withstand the idolaclastic onslaughts of legal realism. If international 
law is moribund, it would be better to bury it forthrightly than to have 
it cannibalized by the realistic school for digestion into propaganda.”58 
Wolfgang Friedmann, however, questioned whether McDougal, by de-
fining a set of policy goals and values that shaped the direction of in-
ternational law, adopted a “value philosophy” that alienated a great ma-
jority of legal realists.59 These goals and values of “an ‘inclusive’ order 
of human dignity” have the flaws of “natural law ideology” and “can, at 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Josef L. Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations 169 (1968). 
57 See Anderson, supra note 45, at 382. 
58 Id. at 383. 
59 See generally Wolfgang Friedmann, Law and Minimum World Public Order and the Public 
Order of the Oceans, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 606 (1964) (book review). 
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best, outline the conditions of an international law of cooperation, not 
those of the international law of coexistence.”60 The manner in which 
McDougal fuses law and policy, Friedmann argues, runs the risk of ren-
dering international law merely a convenient instrument of national 
policy.61 Followed to its logical conclusion, McDougal’s doctrine, in 
which the standpoint of the policy-maker vis-à-vis human dignity de-
termines legal outcomes, “is ultimately destructive of any ‘minimum 
world order.’”62 Although this might be affirmation of Dean Acheson’s 
remarks on the irrelevance of international law to national survival,63 
its gravity and risks to a minimum world order as the precondition to 
developing goals of human dignity should not be lost on McDougal, 
who genuinely believed in the relevance of international law to ensure 
the survival of mankind and to promote human dignity.64 
                                                                                                                     
 Taking the criticism to its limits, Anthony D’Amato challenges New 
Haven’s policy-oriented international law on two counts.65 The first and 
most fundamental problem lies in McDougal’s equation of reasonable-
ness with legality.66 The broad test of reasonableness applied by 
McDougal, along with the breadth of contextual factors recommended 
for consideration and the significance of strict adherence to the speci-
ficities of context replaces the predictability of law with “psychological 
debility of ex post facto rationalization.”67 If McDougal’s approach is to 
be accepted, there is a danger of changing legal thinking “from the 
propounding of broad beneficial conventions and improvement of ex-
isting rules to the detailed rationalizing of the factors of specific cas-
es.”68 The erosion of rigid rules would in turn lead to a clash of inter-
national claims that “otherwise would never arise.”69 The second 
problem would be loss of respect for the rule of law if general applica-
bility and precedent were sacrificed in the interest of the specific condi-
tions of each new context.70 On a practical level, decision-makers would 
 
60 Id. at 613. 
61 Id. at 608. 
62 Id. 
63 See Dean Acheson, Remarks, Panel: Cuban Quarantine: Implications for the Future, 57 Am. 
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 13, 14 (1963). 
64 See Friedmann, supra note 59, at 608. 
65 See Anthony D’Amato, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 458, 460–61 (1961) (reviewing 
Studies in World Public Order (Myres S. McDougal ed., 1960)). 




70 Id. at 460–61. 
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always face a choice between equally reasonable claims.71 Absent at 
least a few rigid rules, power would inevitably write the rules of the 
game.72 To assume that the remedy is in reciprocity, as McDougal does, 
merely speaks of hankering after an image of utopia.73 
                                                                                                                     
 Starting from a practical orientation and moving within a different 
line of argument from the positivist concern with delimiting law, Rich-
ard Posner took issue with McDougal’s reliance on customary interna-
tional law in outer space.74 In Posner’s view, McDougal’s elaboration on 
both the implications of uniform rules of access and competence in 
space and the significance of the Soviet Union’s past practice was ir-
relevant and confused.75 That McDougal put the onus on the Soviet 
Union to prove the lawfulness of its potential exercise of exclusive 
competence over the spacecraft of other states in light of its history of 
acquiescence to the freedom of space so far as peaceful vehicles were 
concerned betrayed a confusion between law, power politics, and man-
kind’s ideals of a rational world order.76 To speak of custom in the area 
of outer space—the vital national interest of the two superpowers “in 
the academic and even casuistic fashion” of McDougal and his associ-
ates—was to lose sight of the difference between law, power, and uni-
versal aspirations toward peace and justice.77 “These areas may overlap 
and interpenetrate, but they are not the same.”78 McDougal’s use of 
custom in a field as exotic as outer space operates in a fantasy world 
wherein law and power are one and the same.79 
 Longing for legal distinctiveness in terms no more compromising 
than the positivists, Stanley Hoffman pronounced that the NHS did its 
 
71 See D’Amato, supra note 65, at 460. 
72 See id. at 461. 
73 See id. 
74 Richard Posner, Review of Law and Public Order in Space by Myres S. McDougal, Harold 
Lasswell & Ivan Vlasic, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1370, 1372–73 (1964) (book review). 
75 Id. at 1372. 
76 Id. at 1372–73. Posner asks: 
Is not all of this [talk of custom and burden of proof] rather beside the point? 
To whom would the Soviet Union have to prove the “lawfulness” of its con-
duct—of what practical significance would its “onus” be? Can the Soviet Un-
ion, in the space arena, be dismissed as “only one of many interested states”? 
Is it enough that the Soviet Union might be restrained by fear of retaliation 
by the United States—are we speaking of law or the balance of power? 
Id. at 1372. 
77 Id. at 1372–73. 
78 Id. at 1373. 
79 See id. at 1373–74. 
78 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:59 
best to undermine all the constituents of law’s distinctiveness.80 To 
Hoffman: 
Law is distinguished from other political instruments by cer-
tain formal features: there is a certain solemnity to its estab-
lishment; it has to be elaborated in a certain way. More signifi-
cantly, the legal order, even in international affairs, has a life 
and logic of its own: there are courts and legal experts who 
apply standards of interpretation that are often divorced from 
underlying political and social factors.81 
 Oran Young was similarly concerned about law losing its discrimi-
natory power in the hands of those who advocated for policy-oriented 
jurisprudence.82 The dispute was not over the existence of a “world 
constitutive process of authoritative decision,” but rather how to desig-
nate this process “not simply in the interest of preserving certain verbal 
formulae but of maintaining sufficient distinctions between social cate-
gories.”83 In Young’s view, the utility of maintaining what McDougal 
derisively and hyperbolically called an “Austinian” conception of law 
was to allow for “explor[ing] the connections between the law of a so-
cial system on the one hand and the changing distribution of power or 
the evolution of authority relations in the system on the other.”84 
McDougal rejected any such division as obscurantism, mainly because 
he defined the political process in such a narrow way that in order to 
accommodate the fluidity of authoritative process, he had to expand 
the scope of legal process.85 In McDougal’s view, Young’s demand for a 
distinction between the law of a social process and the dynamic distri-
bution of power and evolution of authority is an example of “much too 
common a practice among social scientists, as well as among some un-
enlightened lawyers, to accept a limited, conventional, and parochial 
conception of law . . . and to conclude, hence, that naked power reigns 
supreme in ‘international relations’ or ‘the international system.’”86 In 
fact, as Robert Wood demonstrates, Young, “like most political scien-
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81 Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Rela-
tions, 57 Am. Soc. Int’l. L. Proc. 26, 33 (1963). 
82 Young, supra note 43, at 64. 
83 Wood, supra note 37, at 429–30. 
84 Young, supra note 43, at 64. 
85 Wood, supra note 37, at 430. 
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tists, distinguishes in the first instance between ‘naked power’ and ‘po-
litical power,’ particularly in reference to a ‘political community.’”87 
 Like Lasswell and McDougal, integrationists consider “[i]nterde- 
pendence and consciousness of interdependence” to constitute the es-
sence of a political system or a social community and, thus, identify a 
political community with the conscious pursuit of social transactions on 
the basis of “the authoritative distribution of values.”88 To them, legal 
systems, which embody a set of rules and principles, “are both aspects 
and outcomes of this authoritative process,” and though they can be 
evaluated in light of the fluid process of the authoritative distribution 
of values, they cannot be mistaken for the whole process.89 Thus, while 
many of the social scientists and lawyers who call on McDougal and 
Lasswell to distinguish between different social categories agree about 
the breadth of authoritative processes of decision-making, they distin-
guish between naked power, political power, and legal principles, rules, 
and standards.90 What is disputed, then, is in effect the scope of the 
authoritative decision-making processes.91 Lasswell and McDougal as-
similate politics in its entirety into the legal processes of authoritative 
decision-making, while political scientists, in a disciplinary rivalry, 
maintain the political nature of authoritative decision-making processes 
and limit jurisdiction to where legal principles, rules, and standards are 
at work in a specialized institutional setting.92 Expanding the scope of 
the legal process of authoritative decision-making in the New Haven 
Jurisprudence meant eclipsing politics for the political scientist, just as 
it portended the demise of law for the mainstream international law 
discipline. Introduced to the configurative jurisprudence of New Ha-
ven, both sets of professionals were distraught that they no longer rec-
ognized their uniquely held disciplinary identities in a system that cor-
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roded each and every conceivable distinction between various social 
categories. 
 The international law discipline’s skepticism about the absence of 
an adequate distinction between different categories of authoritative 
processes of decision-making in the New Haven Jurisprudence mirrors 
its frustration with McDougal’s exaggerated and one-sided portrayal of 
his opponents’ defense of potential flexibility in the application of 
rules, principles, and standards.93 In the interest of replacing law with 
power, as the argument goes, McDougal castigates the “rule-oriented” 
approach as an illusory hope in “rules hav[ing] a meaning or ‘norma-
tive character’ largely independent of the purposes of the people who 
make use of them; and [in] these rules admit[ting], apparently without 
aid of criteria of interpretation, of practically automatic application in 
particular instances.”94 By attributing to his opponents a “model of au-
tomation in decision”95 and utter disregard for the complementary na-
ture of both rules and policies, and, further, by challenging their un-
awareness of what he calls the general normative ambiguity of rules, 
McDougal is understood to practically end any substantial dialogue 
about the actual interaction of rules and policies and irreversibly de-
clare the rule-oriented approach futile.96 His impatience with any con-
sideration by his opponents of the flexibility of principles and stan-
dards, if not the openness of precise rules per se, along with his 
unwavering faith in the liberating force of policy applied in a manner 
consistent with the order of the masters of power, leads to suspicions 
that law in the hands of McDougal is “merely an increment to power.”97 
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work for International Legal Analysis: Inquiry into the Work of Myres S. McDougal 156 (Apr. 
16, 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with Edward 
Bennett Williams Law Library, Georgetown University). 
94 Myres S. McDougal, A Footnote, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 383, 383 (1963). 
95 Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A 
Contemporary International Law of the Sea 48 n.124 (1962) [hereinafter McDougal 
& Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans] (“One can only wonder where Prof. Fisher 
is able to observe in flesh his model of automation in decision, and by what criteria he 
recommends that particular choices be made between inevitably complementary policies 
of the international law of the sea.”). 
96 See Daniel, supra note 93, at 167. 
97 Anderson, supra note 45, at 382. Anderson finds ample evidence for his argument in 
some of McDougal’s writings on power: 
Among the instruments of power, when power is comprehensively conceived, 
there might be recognized, finally, not merely diplomacy, propaganda, ar-
maments, and goods, but an international law which is an expression, not of 
an arbitrary political fiat, but of the fundamental policies of peoples and in 
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 Distinguishing between policy-oriented jurisprudence and its ap-
plication by McDougal and his associates to questions of world public 
order, one scholar locates the problem not in the comprehensive au-
thoritative process of decision-making itself, but in the notion that 
McDougal conflates the descriptive with the prescriptive.98 Using the 
NHS’s own terminology, when “theory about law” is used as “theory of 
law, or at least of law-making,” cynicism about rules is expected.99  This 
is reminiscent of legal realism’s relationship to rules, precedent, and 
stare decisis.100 While it is true that the mere development of a theory 
that minimizes or questions the utility of rules does not change existing 
expectations about the role of rules, it is also true that propagating con-
textualism or empirical methods does not necessarily synchronize the 
standard, societal understanding of legal reasoning or diminish the 
generally expected central role of law in most legal contexts.101 In this 
reading, conflating theories about law and theories of law is not essen-
tial to the contextualist theory of Lasswell and McDougal, but rather it 
is incidental to the way they have implemented their policy-oriented 
jurisprudence in addressing practical questions of international law.102 
“The very expectation that law is distinct and different from politics, or 
that it does or does not operate in international relations, is a matter 
for investigation in different settings.”103 
 Other scholars consider rules, merely for practical reasons, to have 
a relatively significant role.104 Rules are “rational and indispensable” in 
many decision-making contexts simply because of “the possibility and 
desirability of promoting greater uniformity and hence predictability of 
decision by limiting the variety of contextual factors that a decision-
maker . . . should be encouraged to take into account.”105 Rules, like 
                                                                                                                      
 
which decision-makers have a continuous creative role in formulating, apply-
ing, and re-formulating such policies. 
Myres S. McDougal, Dr. Schwartzenberger’s Power Politics, 47 Am. J. Int’l L. 115, 119 (1953) 
(book review) [hereinafter McDougal, Dr. Schwartzenberger’s Power Politics], quoted in Ander-
son, supra note 45, at 382. 
98 Tipson, supra note 31, at 241. 
99 Id. at 241–42. 
100 See, e.g., William Twining & David Miers, How to Do Things with Rules: A 
Primer of Interpretation 48–72 (1976) (providing a foundation for rules in general); 
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1038–40 (1961). 
101 Tipson, supra note 31, at 242. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 242–43. 
105 Tom J. Farer, International Law and Political Behavior: Toward a Conceptual Liaison, 25 
World Pol. 430, 440–41 (1973), quoted in Tipson, supra note 31, at 242–43; see Ian Brown-
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theories, are therefore essential to reduce the “overwhelming bulk” of 
social phenomena to a volume that is manageable in practical decision-
making.106 This is salient especially when interpreting international le-
gal agreements because the text itself provides a strong basis for identi-
fying and considering all relevant contextual factors.107 
C. Policy-Orientation as Conceptual Grandiloquence 108 
 The third series of critiques targets the style of presentation in the 
New Haven Jurisprudence.109 Complex style and perplexing terminol-
ogy are trademarks of Lasswell’s work that find their way into the New 
Haven Jurisprudence. During his tenure with the Wartime Communi-
cations Research Project, the main task of which was to apply content 
analysis to American fascist propaganda, Lasswell was presented with an 
opportunity to fulfill his dream of psychiatrist-as-king and activist.110 
Lasswell’s high hopes for a positive role for social scientists, however, 
went awry in large part due to his abstruse expression.111 The govern-
                                                                                                                      
lie, The Public Order of the Oceans, 12 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1053, 1056 (1963) (book review). 
Brownlie seems to be concerned about the value and practical usage of The Public Order of 
the Oceans, compared to “a text, a set of clear prescriptions,” for decision-makers “who have 
to live by the law and custom of the sea.” Id. 
106 Farer, supra note 105, at 441–42. 
107 See Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our “Interpre-
tation” of It?, 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 358, 369 (1971) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal et al., 
The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order (1967)); Gidon 
Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law, 21 World Pol. 108, 110 
(1968) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and 
World Public Order (1967)). 
108 The word is borrowed from Erwin Griswold who, recognizing the importance of 
Lasswell and McDougal’s approach to legal education, nevertheless found it to be “im-
paired by a certain tendency towards grandiloquence.” Erwin Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 
81 Harv. L. Rev. 292, 297 (1968). 
109 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, at 360–61; Fred Rodell, Legal Realists, Legal Funda-
mentalists, Lawyer Schools, and Policy Science—Or How Not to Teach Law, 1 Vand. L. Rev. 5, 6–7 
(1947) (suggesting that McDougal’s style is plagued with verbosity and outlandishness). 
Fitzmaurice offers a spirited critique of McDougal and his co-authors’ style in The Interpre-
tation of Agreements and World Public Order, noting, 
[T]his book . . . is written in a highly esoteric private language[—]we do not 
say jargon, but a kind of juridical code which renders large tracts of it virtually 
incomprehensible to the uninitiated (or at least to the unpracticed and un-
versed), short of a word by word “construe,” such as we did in school with our 
Latin unseens. 
Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, 360. 
110 Mark Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Ob-
jectivity and Purpose, 1918–1941, at 246, 247–48 (1994). 
111 See id. at 247–48. 
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ment, being wary of the dangers of emphasizing ideology, wished to 
keep the project entirely limited to research on facts and figures.112 
Lasswell tried to convince his superiors of the importance of a positive 
movement against fascism, proclaiming, “[i]f democracy is to endure, 
democracy must make propaganda in favor of itself and against propa-
ganda hostile to itself.”113 His inability to make a convincing point 
about this normative view of propaganda and the positive role of social 
scientists was partly due to the general discomfort of his superiors with 
propaganda, and mostly due to his usage of technical vocabulary and 
putatively scientific methods that were incomprehensible to anyone 
outside his research group.114 
 This story resonates with many international lawyers who encoun-
ter Lasswell and McDougal’s work. Lasswell alone is said to “move heav-
en and earth to find the picayune meaningful,” if only for the fact that 
“he operates best with high abstractions and adores the game of multi-
variable ping-pong.”115 When Erwin Griswold noted a tendency toward 
“grandiloquence” in the New Haven proposal, he specifically had the 
first Lasswell-McDougal collaboration on legal education in mind.116 
Despite the intended limited application of the term, many in the field 
found the term grandiloquence to be applicable to the complex lan-
guage and sophisticated conceptual framework used throughout New 
Haven’s jurisprudence.117 
 In terms of accessibility and comprehensibility, the pedagogical 
program of policy science at Yale did not fare any better than its volumi-
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. at 247. 
113 Id. (quoting Memorandum from Harold D. Lasswell to Henry Morgenthau, Sec’y of 
the Treasury (Feb. 17, 1941)). Smith recounts that, disappointed with then-Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s lack of enthusiasm about Lasswell’s proposals for positive 
propaganda, 
[Lasswell] descended on [Office of Facts and Figures] director [Archibald] 
MacLeish and bombarded him with an array of technical material and verbiage. 
MacLeish, an internationally recognized poet and cultural critic, certainly real-
ized and respected the power of words and ideas. But he recollected that this 
meeting left him unconvinced and ignorant of Lasswell’s main points. 
Id. 
114 Id. at 248. 
115 Leo Rosten, Harold Lasswell: A Memoir, in Politics, Personality, and Social Sci-
ence in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell 1, 9 (Ar-
nold A. Rogow ed., 1969). 
116 See Griswold, supra note 108, at 297. 
117 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, at 360. 
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nous scholarly texts.118 It faced agnosticism similar to the popular mid-
twentieth century concerns about the return of natural law.119 Jerome 
Frank warned his classes about a new brand of natural law in policy sci-
ences “far vaguer than many of the older brands.”120 Reportedly, many 
students “call[ed] one of the Lasswell-McDougal courses ‘drifting and 
dreaming.’”121 Likewise, the Yale Law faculty found Lasswell to be “a 
queer guy,” and found his “jargon irritating.”122 “They couldn’t under-
stand him,” and “[n]obody on the faculty had much use for [him], but 
he was McDougal’s protégé.”123 
 Reacting to the application of policy sciences to coercion, Fried-
mann unwittingly paid tribute to McDougal by comparing his style to 
that of Hegel, only to charge both at once with the legitimization of he-
gemony.124 “Just as [h]undreds of pages of rigorous conceptual dialec-
tics in Hegel’s Philosophy of Law and State . . . disguise that Hegel really 
wanted to show that the reactionary Prussian monarchy under which he 
held his chair at the University of Berlin was the ultimate embodiment 
of the world spirit,” McDougal’s use of conceptual and indirect lan-
guage was an attempt to embroider a simple and plain allowance for the 
use of nuclear armaments or preemptive self-defense against a Commu-
                                                                                                                      
118 See Stewart Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors: Notes on the Mar-
gins of “Professional Training in the Public Interest,” 54 Va. L. Rev. 617, 635 (1968) (analyzing 
the shortcomings of the Lasswell-McDougal pedagogical approach). Macaulay emphasizes 
the contribution of social sciences to an understanding of “the formal and informal proc-
esses of government as they affect people and are affected by them . . . even prior to value 
analysis,” which the Lasswell-McDougal approach so forcefully advocates. Id. 
119 See id. 
120 Kalman, supra note 10, at 183. 
121 Id. Fuller agreed that Lasswell and McDougal had developed a new type of natural 
law by listing values that aid the decision-maker in determining “what values are to be ef-
fectuated—in other words what he wants . . . . The rest is a mere matter of technical im-
plementation with which Professors McDougal and Lasswell have no direct concern and 
for which they assume no responsibility.” Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-
Century, 6 J. Legal Educ. 457, 479 (1954). For another reading of the policy-oriented ap-
proach in line with natural law, see Crisolito Pascual, The Policy Function of the Law: Value 
Creation, Clarification and Realization, 29 Phil. L.J. 431, 435–38 (1954) (“[T]he [New Ha-
ven] approach may be said to be a vigorous advocacy for a return to the natural law think-
ing, highlighting the apparent failure of the modern theories of law, . . . especially in the 
maintenance of the social interest in the infinite worth and value of human life, personal-
ity and dignity.”) For an approving comparison between McDougal’s advocacy of human 
dignity and natural law, see Dom David Granfield, Towards A Goal-Oriented Consensus, 19 J. 
Legal Educ. 379, 380 (1966) (“Although McDougal’s writings stem apparently from a 
dissimilar philosophical position, they do exhibit remarkable conformity with the Catholic 
philosophia perennis . . . .”). 
122 Kalman, supra note 10, at 184. 
123 Id. 
124 Friedmann, supra note 59, at 609–10. 
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nist state.125 This complexity merely exacerbates the ambiguity and un-
certainty in McDougal’s approach toward the significant and determina-
tive role of policy considerations in international law.126 Thus, beyond a 
matter of random stylistic taste or preference, simplicity and clarity of 
prose were demanded of McDougal in order to deflect suspicions of a 
disguised, spurious agenda.127 
 The critique of abstruseness comes not merely from skeptics, but 
also from those generally sympathetic to the complexity and conceptual-
ism of the New Haven Jurisprudence.128 “One can admire the intellec-
tual resources brought to McDougal’s scholarly conceptualism of law as an 
instrument of social and humanitarian will, without approving unquali-
fiedly the abstruse formulation of principles [therein] enunciated.”129 
Note that the point of contention here is not McDougal’s methodologi-
cal conceptualism and its implications, but rather his conceptual frame-
work, so far as it “cloaks the substance” of the ideas, and his “structural 
idiom” that detracts from the intelligibility of the conceptual formula-
tion of law.130 
 Yet others remained skeptical about the practical impact of the 
New Haven writings on world public order and questioned if the prin-
cipal audience of these writings could in any way benefit from the 
complex style and thought process of the New Haven teachings in ac-
tual decision-making.131 Because McDougal’s recommendations are 
recognized as theoretical and in part visionary, their comprehension is 
restricted to the initiated and the “scholar who needs to know the 
thought behind thought,” and thus remain out of reach for those who 
look for guidance with no interest in digesting “a world maze.”132 This 
is due in part to the fact that the recommendations of McDougal and 
his associates, particularly in areas less subjected to existing regulations, 
                                                                                                                      
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 610. 
127 See id. at 609. 
128 See Alwyn V. Freeman, Professor McDougal’s Law and Minimum World Public Order, 58 
Am. J. Int’l L. 711, 715 (1964) (book review). 
129 Id. (emphasis added). 
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., Claude Mickelwait, Book Review, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 534, 537 (1962) (review-
ing Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public 
Order (1961)) (“[T]he voluminous treatment may detract from its practicality unless an 
authoritative condensation, phrased in the customary terms of the varied contexts, is pro-
vided for the decision-makers who usually lack the time to absorb and appreciate fully the 
complex bases for action set forth in this volume.”). 
132 Cameron Wehringer, Book Review, 31 Brook. L. Rev. 197, 199 (1964) (reviewing 
Myres S. McDougal et al., Law and Public Order in Space (1963)). 
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are prone to theoretical verbosity only loosely in touch with reality.133 
Even when the reader’s mind finds new horizons in McDougal’s work, 
it is doubtful that there is an acceptable balance between the intellec-
tual reward and perseverance required to follow the work’s masterly 
blend of astronomy, sociology, anthropology, and political science.134 
 Another more sophisticated strand of critique of the cumbersome 
apparatus of policy-oriented jurisprudence shifts the attention away 
from mere comprehensibility to the substantive content of the scientific 
claims of policy sciences.135 Under this reading, the problem with 
McDougal’s cumbersome language is its machinations to shield the 
pseudo-scientific nature of the jargon used in order to give an illusion 
of mastery of scientific language.136 McDougal and his associates offer 
postulates in the format of a conceptual formula using the language of 
symbols without creating equations or any other mathematical medium 
to make sense of those symbols.137 Reducing propositions to symbols 
without mathematical models, however, is little more than a mockery of 
scientific work—it is in effect only creating symbols for the sake of sym-
bols.138 The “turgid style” of the New Haven School writings is a lamen-
table heritage of social scientists, which paradoxically, “while attempt-
ing to create order,” in fact “create[s] a form of chaos.”139 
                                                                                                                      
133 The reviewer refers to McDougal and his coauthors’ elaboration on “inclusive en-
joyment versus exclusive appropriation,” using the example of the Antarctica Treaty, and 
questions the authors’ claim that it was in fact enlightenment that resolved difficulties in 
the Antarctica. “In Antarctica, if enlightenment means self-interest, it can be power based. 
The Antarctica Treaty did not resolve difficulties, but . . . it ‘froze’ the status of conflicting 
claims.” Id. 
134 See D.H.N. Johnson, Book Review, 13 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1121, 1122 (1964) (re-
viewing Myres S. McDougal et al., Law and Public Order in Space (1963)). But see 
James Milton Brown, Law and Public Order in Space, 36 Miss. L.J. 116, 119 (1964) (book 
review) (“It is disappointing to find legally-trained critics, whose functional lives evolve 
around a special vocabulary, complain . . . over the need to devote a little effort to acquire 
the precision tools of the Public Order vocabulary.”); and Edward Hambro, Law and Mini-
mum World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 745, 
748 (1962) (book review) (“The reading of the book needs a certain amount of hard work, 
but once the reader masters the terminology of the book, he is richly rewarded. He will 
not always find the solution to all the problems, but he will find a penetrating analysis, a 
fresh approach, and original thought.”). 
135 See Allison Scafuri, Book Review, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 863, 864–66 (1965) (reviewing 
Myres S. McDougal et al., Law and Public Order in Space (1963)). 
136 See id. at 863. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 863, 865. 
139 Id. at 863 (finding analogy in H.L. Menken’s review of Thorstein Veblen, The 
Theory of the Leisure Class (1918)). 
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 Despite the stylistic criticism, however, some scholars recognized 
the intellectual capital needed to engage with McDougal’s language 
and found it to be rewarding through the heightened awareness it 
raised about the world legal order.140 “A reader should be prepared . . . 
for an austere pilgrimage, unalleviated by witty asides or enhancing 
quotations.”141 Falk attributes the general criticism of McDougal’s ob-
scure jargon and murky sentences to many who privately concede that 
they in fact have lacked the time or patience to navigate through the 
policy-oriented jurisprudence.142 In Falk’s view, McDougal’s style corre-
sponds to his intellectual ambitions.143 McDougal, borrowing from 
Lasswell, aims to present a comprehensive and systemic account of so-
cial realities that impact the process and structure of policy choices in 
legal decision-making.144 Such a lofty endeavor needs a precise, though 
perhaps unconventional, linguistic device. The complexity of McDou-
gal’s writings “stems from an insistence upon nuance and accuracy, not 
from an infatuation with German metaphysics, or some inborn quality 
of verbal ineptitude.”145 “His sentences are almost always impossible to 
improve upon.”146 Stylistic criticisms of McDougal stem from an anti-
intellectualism that expects accessible language in legal writings for the 
benefit of the uninitiated.147 But McDougal’s framework of analysis, 
which reflects a complicated image of social reality, is comparable to 
Einsteinian physics in its usage of a complex language to open a new 
path of inquiry into realities that habitually remain masked from law-
yers’ views.148 
 To take stock, the three categories of critiques of policy-oriented 
jurisprudence—policy as legitimization, policy as invasion of power into 
law, and policy framework as conceptual grandiloquence—comprise 
the body of the critical reactions provoked by the methodological re-
newal of the New Haven Jurisprudence.149 As is evident, McDougal’s 
interlocutors, when they were able to see beyond problems with the 
accessibility of New Haven’s approach, focused on either ideological 
                                                                                                                      
140 E.g., Falk, supra note 49, at 643. 
141 Id. 
142 See id. at 658. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 644, 658. 
145 Id. at 658. 
146 Falk, supra note 49, at 658. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See Anderson, supra note 45, at 382; Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, at 360–61; Fried-
mann, supra note 59, at 608; Rodell, supra note 109, at 6–7. 
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analyses or the ill consequences of New Haven’s conception of power 
for the rule of law.150 
 To be sure, there were sharper critical voices who found fault with 
McDougal’s faith in an absolute concept of human dignity and its de-
termining role for legal outcomes.151 Some took issue with the lack of 
adequate empirical inquiry in the New Haven Jurisprudence, despite 
“ambiguous hints to the contrary,” to validate the postulated values of 
human dignity, which remain “rather ab extra scientiam (though perhaps 
ab intra McDougal).”152 Others challenged McDougal’s confidence in a 
consensus about values and his Suarezian vision of “world community” 
with homogeneous values.153 Still others highlighted the threat that 
McDougal’s thought posed to the rule of law by prescribing human 
dignity as the favored value of the interpreter in the interpretation of 
rules or international agreements.154 Further, some accused McDougal 
of Hegelian idealism because he considered conflicting interests to be 
capable of resolving themselves to the satisfaction of the parties in-
volved and that of the “policy of the world community” through a priori 
values.155 And still others believed that McDougal’s invocation of postu-
lated values of human dignity as the foundational criteria of legality 
masked the oppressive role of social structures, and thereby forestalled 
a more concrete criticism that would place in the foreground factors of 
class, gender, and race.156 
 Like other external critiques, however, these more insightful reac-
tions failed to engage with New Haven’s internal, epistemic structure. 
Finding fault with the nature and place of the values representing hu-
man dignity in the NHS and identifying that as another form of foun-
dationalism is one thing,157 but delineating how exactly this founda-
                                                                                                                      
 
150 See Anderson, supra note 45, at 382; Friedmann, supra note 59, at 608. 
151 See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Con-
temporary Approaches 100 (1993); Julius Stone, Problems Confronting Sociological Enquiries 
Concerning International Law, 89 Recueil des Cours 61, 73 n.1 (1956). 
152 Stone, supra note 151, at 73 n.1. 
153 See id. at 113 n.1. 
154 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 100. 
155 E.g., Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45 Brit. Y.B. 
Int’l L. 79, 125 (1971). 
156 E.g., Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 
Yale L.J. 1991, 2007 (1995) (reviewing McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a 
Free Society, supra note 7). 
157 These values, which are in fact categories of desired events or preferences, are: 
power (participation in making important decisions—those involving severe deprivations); 
respect (access to other values on the basis of merit without discrimination on grounds 
irrelevant to capacity); enlightenment (access to knowledge, which is the basis of rational 
choice); wealth (control over economic goods and services); well-being (enjoyment of 
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tionalism affected New Haven’s problem-oriented policy approach, and 
what this meant for decision-making in international law, is quite an-
other. Interestingly, such an engagement—one that takes the claims, 
premises, and promises of McDougal’s thought seriously enough to 
evaluate its function on its own terms—is absent from the scant ac-
counts that find the policy-oriented and problem-solving characters of 
the New Haven Jurisprudence consistent with the insights of pragma-
tism. The result is that human dignity and pragmatism, the two identify-
ing faces of the Lasswell-McDougal project, which correlate with its 
normative and scientific commitments, remain epistemologically dis-
connected. Even after taking into account all the strands of criticism, it 
remains unclear why the pragmatist promises of contextualism and 
problem-solving methodology were unfulfilled. Nor do we learn wheth-
er or how the relationship between human dignity and pragmatism in 
the New Haven Jurisprudence may be related to, or explain, the logical 
correspondence between the policy-oriented approach and American 
foreign policy dictates. 
II. Pragmatism and International Law in the  
New Haven Jurisprudence 
 Counting generously, there are only a handful of reflections on 
pragmatism and international legal theory. When considering a prag-
matist representative in international law, however, these sparse ac-
counts all turn their gaze toward the NHS’s policy-oriented approach. 
One would expect to easily trace the intellectual footprint of pragma-
tism in Lasswell’s work through his years in Chicago, where Dewey’s 
thought traveled into various social scientific disciplines.158 But Lasswell 
himself, the mind behind policy science, did not acknowledge an ex-
plicit intellectual debt to philosophical pragmatism, founded by 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, except for a 
few cursory observations in his later writings.159 The Lasswell-McDougal 
                                                                                                                      
 
physical and psychic health); skill (proficiency in the exercise of latent talent); affection 
(enjoyment of sympathetic human relationships); and rectitude (sharing a sense of com-
munity responsibility). See Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Con-
temporary Conception, 82 Recueil des Cours 133, 168 (1953) [hereinafter McDougal, Inter-
national Law, Power, and Policy]. 
158 See Harold D. Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, at xiii–xiv (1971) [here-
inafter Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences]. 
159 In 1971, Lasswell wrote: “The policy sciences are a contemporary adaptation of the 
general approach to public policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his col-
leagues in the development of American pragmatism.” Id. at xiv. Earlier on in his first ex-
position on policy sciences, Lasswell had a less direct reference to his affinity for pragma-
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policy-oriented international law does not include any direct or indirect 
mention of pragmatism either. This is quite consistent with the history 
of pragmatism itself, which went out of philosophical fashion right 
around the birth of the NHS and reappeared as neopragmatism well 
after the maturity of McDougal’s jurisprudence.160 
 In fact, in McDougal’s time, Philip Allott appears to have been the 
only commentator who directly took note of pragmatism, though only 
in the context of denying McDougal a place either in the American 
pragmatist tradition or in realism.161 There was, Allott said, “too much 
of a priori in McDougal . . . a certain Hegelian element . . . in the basic 
concept of McDougal’s method, that of states with competing interests 
which must be resolved into something which satisfies both sides and 
also satisfies the policy of the world community (world-spirit).”162 Al-
lott’s brief but keen observation gets to the heart of the problem of a 
priori concepts, such as human dignity and its correlatives such as 
community policy, inherent in the NHS.163 It does not, however, go far 
enough to explain what a pragmatist commitment to the normative 
values of human dignity would look like or to articulate the conse-
quences of McDougal’s accommodation of a priori values for his prob-
lem-solving and contextualist ambitions. Allott seems to be after the 
philosophical roots of McDougal’s normative commitments164 and his 
                                                                                                                      
 
tism. See The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method 12 (Daniel 
Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1951) [hereinafter The Policy Sciences]. On another 
occasion, Lasswell makes a curious comparison between pragmatism and mysticism: 
“Pragmatists assert that the quest for truth is a ‘logic of inquiry.’ It is, therefore, an experi-
ence in self-discipline in the course of which the knowledge and perhaps the order of 
preference of the inquirer is open to change.” Harold D. Lasswell, The Future of Po-
litical Science 155 (1963). 
160 For a fine history of philosophy of pragmatism, see Pragmatism: From Progressiv-
ism to Postmodernism (Robert Hollinger & David Depew eds., 1995). But see Robert Talisse, 
Pragmatism and the Cold War, in The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy 254 (Cheryl 
Misak ed., 2008) (arguing against the eclipse of pragmatism through the Cold War). 
161 Allott, supra note 155, at 125. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. 
164 Allott believes that no tradition of political and moral philosophy is relevant except 
for utilitarianism: 
There is abundant evidence . . . that McDougal accepts the possibility of a 
“calculus of values”, in the style of Bentham; . . . It seems clear that he feels 
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mention of pragmatism is as cursory as a simple rejection of its connec-
tion with the NHS.165 
 Only after its renascence and reemergence on the legal theory 
scene166 did pragmatism receive some attention—though scant—in 
international law.167 In Patterns of American Jurisprudence, Neil Duxbury 
intriguingly suggests that the NHS, in spite of all that Lasswell and 
McDougal might have intended to the contrary, “represents a suppres-
sion rather than a continuation of the realist faith in pragmatism.”168 
Duxbury admits that this claim is “strange” because the purpose of pol-
icy-oriented jurisprudence seems to be the strengthening of the prob-
lem-solving and policy-making skills of the would-be-lawyer.169 The path 
of the policy-oriented approach is linked to the history of Dewey’s 
thought after World War II.170 Lasswell and McDougal adopted Dewey’s 
conception of democracy as a set of basic human ideals, the optimum 
realization of which calls for proper institutions throughout society.171 
Furthermore, policy science, similar to Dewey’s attempt to reconstruct 
philosophy,172 expounded a set of intellectual tasks to reconstruct legal 
education and the legal profession.173 
 An emphasis on democracy and the cultivation of a set of intellec-
tual skills however, Duxbury writes, does not make policy science a prag-
matic theory.174 “For policy science is too preoccupied with the devel-
opment of a methodology and too little concerned with the matter of 
how that methodology may prove in some way to be useful.”175 Policy 
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
165 See id. 
166 See, e.g., Michal Alberstein, Pragmatism and Law: From Philosophy to Dis-
pute Resolution (2002); Michael Brint & William Weaver, Pragmatism in Law and 
Society (1991); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Sociolegal Theory: Pragmatism and 
A Social Theory of Law (1997); Renascent Pragmatism: Studies in Law and Social 
Science (Alfonso Morales ed., 2003); The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on So-
cial Thought, Law, and Culture (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998). 
167 See Duxbury, supra note 8, at 191. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 200. 
170 Id. 
171 See, e.g., Allan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism 
(1995); Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (1991). 
172 See generally John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1948). 
173 See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the role of each of the five intellectual tasks 
in the New Haven Jurisprudence: goal clarification, trend thinking, scientific thinking, 
developmental thinking, and alternative thinking). For further comparison of Lasswell-
McDougal and Dewey, see Frederick Samson Tipson, Note, The Lasswell-McDougal Enter-
prise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 535, 539–40 (1974). 
174 Duxbury, supra note 8, at 201. 
175 Id. 
92 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:59 
science jurisprudence, thus, is “[a]t best groundwork; interpreted less 
charitably, it is the use of theory to encourage procrastination over mat-
ters practical.”176 
                                                                                                                     
 Duxbury’s reading seems to promise the right destination. Never-
theless, it neither takes the right direction, nor goes far enough on the 
road to that destination. His concern, in the last analysis, is similar to the 
earlier complaints regarding McDougal’s conceptual grandiloquence:177 
“The idea that [lawyers] might achieve as much by becoming versed in 
the language and methods of policy science demanded too great a leap 
of faith. It demanded also, certainly of academic lawyers, too radical a 
reorientation of perspective.”178 This recognition certainly carries a 
great deal of explanatory power and historical significance for under-
standing the career of the New Haven Jurisprudence and its reception 
by the international legal discipline.179 The overemphasis on the role of 
experts—policy scientists of democracy and international lawyers of 
human dignity—corresponds to the fate of pragmatism in the United 
States after Dewey and throughout most of the Cold War. As far as the 
contribution of philosophical pragmatism is concerned, however, Dux-
bury’s account reduces it to mere practicability. Equating pragmatism 
with practicability is little more than a vernacular reading of pragmatism 
and sets a very low threshold for the understanding of both pragmatism 
and New Haven’s policy-oriented international law. 
 In a constructivist proposal, Harry Gould and Nicholas Onuf sug-
gest that pragmatism can provide constructivism with everything it 
needs epistemically to present an alternative view of rules as social con-
structs against ontological realism.180 This pragmatist approach to the 
conditions of rule, however, is found neither in the early pragmatism of 
Peirce, James, and Dewey, nor in Legal Realism.181 Dewey delved into 
political theory but did not consider the conditions of rule in any of his 
writings. Likewise, Legal Realists paid great attention to methods of ad-
judication and the study of law, but were uninterested in broader politi-
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eds., 2009). 
181 See id. at 38. 
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cal theory.182 To find a pragmatist view of the conditions of rule, Gould 
and Onuf suggest that one should turn to the New Haven Jurispru-
dence, which they introduce as pragmatism’s representative in interna-
tional law.183 
 Starting with Legal Realism’s position about “the instrumentality of 
the law and its reconceptualization as a locus of judgment,” Lasswell and 
McDougal proceeded a step further, delineating the process of “authori-
tative decision” and its relation to “effective control,”184 and asking oft-
neglected questions such as: how to identify rules; who may prescribe 
rules (for whom and by what procedures); who may invoke rules; and 
how to apply and appraise the effectiveness of rules.185 These are not 
merely questions about rules but also about rule—that is, rule as proc-
ess.186 That said, New Haven’s pragmatist view of rule as process poses a 
conceptually binary opposition between two different world public or-
ders—minimum and optimum187—which may not be entirely consistent 
with pragmatism’s rejection of absolute and binary distinctions.188 Rec-
ognizing the NHS’s pragmatist potentials, Gould and Onuf still believe 
that its “daunting conceptual vocabulary and latent rule-skepticism” ob-
scure conditions of rule.189 In their view, the NHS’s emphasis on “the 
degree of centralization, or . . . respect for human dignity” in differenti-
ating between minimum and optimum world public orders neglects 
more delicate and important differences in forms of rule.190 
 Gould and Onuf’s reference to the centrality of human dignity cap-
tures a significant issue at the heart of the NHS which has negative bear-
ings for its claim to pragmatism. Their concern is to identify variations 
in rule depending on context and social process in which rules and rule 
perform different functions.191 Their quibble is with the liberal assump-
tion about order as spontaneous, natural, and benign (or not always be-
nign but nevertheless easily manageable and subject to quick adjust-
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ments).192 They also take issue with the NHS’s discount of rule and rules 
in a world of minimum public order where human dignity is not suffi-
ciently respected, but, as they suggest, where some “functionally limited 
hierarchical arrangements” do exist.193 Gould and Onuf do not, how-
ever, address the internal structure of policy-oriented jurisprudence and 
the consequences of the centrality of human dignity for its pragmatist 
and problem-solving promises. Further, beyond quick references to 
pragmatism’s incompatibility with binary distinctions, they say little 
about the precise implementation of the NHS’s pragmatist promises of 
contextualism in relation to the central role of human dignity. 
 The last and most recent account of international law and pragma-
tism belongs to an enthusiast for the potential of philosophical pragma-
tism to bring practice and action back to the center of international le-
gal argument.194 Siegfried Schieder, who in an earlier work presented a 
discursive reading of pragmatism in line with neopragmatism,195 posits 
two reasons for the lack of attention in literature to the influence of 
pragmatism on the international legal system.196 The first reason is that 
“perceptive boundaries between pragmatism and international law may 
generally impede philosophy from engaging with a practical science.”197 
Alternatively, the second reason posits that since pragmatism is under-
stood to relate to the entirety of legal decisions, and since there is lim-
ited adjudication in international relations, there has not been adequate 
interest in pragmatism’s contribution to international law.198 Why 
Schieder considers international law to be merely a “practical science” is 
quite curious. Pragmatism’s connection to legal theory through the 
medium of adjudication and the low priority of adjudication in interna-
tional politics, however, is not too farfetched as a possible reason for the 
dearth of attention to pragmatism in international law. 
 In Schieder’s view, the policy-oriented approach of the NHS is 
closely related to “the specific American products of instrumentalism 
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and philosophical pragmatism.”199 Adopting a secondary literature de-
scription,200 he lists five features of legal pragmatism—antifounda-
tionalism, contextualism, instrumentalism, consequentialism, and per-
spectivism—in order to argue, in a schematic fashion, that the New Ha-
ven Jurisprudence does in fact live up to these pragmatist demands.201 
 Antifoundationalism in international law, under this account, 
amounts to a rejection of positivism and natural law, both of which have 
traditionally supported deduction of legal decisions from a basic norm 
or a system of norms.202 Against the traditional view of sources of inter-
national law, pragmatism stresses a relational and discursive path by 
virtue of which norms and legal cases come under the law of contin-
gency and historicity.203 This view, Schieder says, is reflected in none 
other than McDougal himself, who questions a metaphysical view of 
rules as autonomous absolutes living in a vacuum.204 
 Schieder’s understanding of (anti)foundationalism is too thin to 
take him beyond a superficial portrayal of McDougal’s view of legal 
normativity. Consider foundationalism in epistemology to refer to (1) a 
set of theories of epistemic justification that rely on a distinction be-
tween basic and inferred beliefs, (2) an a priori conception of episte-
mology on which all claims to knowledge depend, or alternatively (3) 
the idea that our standards of weaker or stronger evidence, and of 
more or less justified beliefs, must be grounded in some relation to jus-
tification and truth.205 Today, foundationalism (as well as its genetically 
related terms of transcendentalism, essentialism, metaphysical, etc.) is 
no stranger in post-realist American jurisprudence.206 When there is a 
lucid account of the relationship between epistemic foundationalism 
and legal theory, however, only foundationalism understood in the 
third aforementioned category is accounted for with an analogue in 
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legal theory: “[T]he idea that legal rules, to be (in a non-epistemic 
sense) justified, must be grounded in some relation to (presumably, 
moral) values.”207 
 Understood as Schieder intends, McDougal’s antifoundationalism 
stands beyond any doubt and a reference to it is almost redundant.208 
This happy ending, however, ignores more than half of the story of 
normativity in policy-oriented jurisprudence. Schieder repeats, almost 
verbatim, McDougal’s claim to empirical verification of values of hu-
man dignity in the NHS as well as his dismissal of philosophical justifi-
cation.209 He does not pause to find evidence for the NHS’s claim to 
empiricism or to ask whether the lack of justification for the normative 
commitments of human dignity may bear any consequences for New 
Haven’s contextualism and problem-solving promises.210 
 Likewise, so far as contextualism is concerned, Schieder’s account 
is content with a worn-out juxtaposition between the American and Eu-
ropean traditions of international law, in which the former is mindful 
of social and political circumstances and the latter is convinced of the 
objectivity and political neutrality of the rule of law.211 Schieder’s snap-
shot of New Haven’s pragmatism, however, does not address what con-
text means in a policy-oriented approach, nor does it address how 
McDougal and his associates employ contextual variables in practice to 
answer legal questions. 
 The remaining three pragmatist features he attributed to the NHS 
are treated with no more diligence in Schieder’s hands.212 An appro-
priate response to Schieder’s list and his reading of New Haven’s prag-
matism is a topic for another occasion. Here it is sufficient to state that 
instrumentalism and consequentialism—both philosophical con-
cepts—are, in Schieder’s view, reduced to McDougal’s successful recon-
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ciliation of law and power;213 perspectivism, as against positivism, is re-
duced to the legal system’s openness to newly emerging norms.214 
III. Contextualism Contextualized: A Re-Assessment of 
Contextual-Orientation of Policy Science  
Against Pragmatic Contextualism 
 As much as contextualism resonates with pragmatism in general, it 
is in fact more distinctively particular to neo-pragmatism’s idea of 
thinking as situated and context-bound.215 This is the belief that all 
thought is rooted in habits and patterns that human beings develop 
either individually or, more importantly, as a collective. The develop-
ment of such patterns and habits is aided by the capacity for language 
and their transmission by culture, the two factors capitalized by the re-
naissant pragmatism of the post-linguistic turn.216 
 Surely it was pragmatism’s understanding of knowing as situated in 
conventions, habits, and practice, as opposed to possessing an a priori 
status, that earned it a badge of victory over foundationalism. Not only 
did pragmatism’s founding fathers debunk the assumption of a begin-
ning point-zero for human knowledge,217 but they also made clear that 
all our inquiries begin with and build upon opinions and beliefs that 
“we” have in stock.218 Given the emphasis on the collective notion of 
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inquiry and the social origins of beliefs and habits from which it pro-
ceeds, pragmatism’s break from foundationalism parts ways with the 
methodological individualism of empiricism as well.219 Still, contextual-
ism is more often associated with neo-pragmatism because with the neo-
Wittgensteinian centrality of language in all “truth” making endeavors 
already standing firm on the philosophical scene, contextualism needed 
only to take the ball and run with it to push contingency and historical 
irony all the way down.220 Nevertheless, unless it is clear what we mean 
by contextualism, a proprietary quibble over the roots of contextualism 
in classical pragmatism or in its postmodern reincarnation is futile.221 
 The historical and practice-bound character of human thought 
and life, if that is meant by contextualism, is not unique to pragmatism, 
old or new. Philosophers as widely apart as Otto Neurath,222 Martin 
Heidegger,223 and Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his later work,224 have all 
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accounted for the constituting role of praxis in human thought. Hegel, 
Marx, the historical school of jurisprudence, and Burkean version of 
conservative socio-political theory had already sung their “songs of ex-
perience”225 and each pondered on the practice-bound character of 
human inquiry before the emergence of pragmatism qua a distinctive 
philosophical tradition.226 It is true that, contrary to the conservative, 
Burkean treatment of history, pragmatism teaches to begin with old 
beliefs and builds upon them only so long as such beliefs and habits do 
not hinder the best usage of the tools of creative intelligence.227 But 
any philosophy that has broken away from foundationalism agrees on 
the situated state of knowing. What, then, pairs the “contextual” with 
“pragmatic” so ubiquitously? Beyond the vernacular, which tends to au-
tomatically equate one with the other, it is perhaps the fact that prag-
matism ranks atop other antifoundational traditions in teasing out how 
exactly context-dependence of human inquiry epistemically defeats 
foundationalism.228 It does so by providing a context-dependent 
ground for our investigative affairs which, taken seriously, is liberated 
from both the illusion of foundational certainty and the chaos of radi-
cal indeterminacy. Regardless of whether pragmatism and epistemic 
contextualism as two existential paradigms of knowledge are merely 
isomorphic, their similar approaches to the role of practice and context 
standing against both foundationalism and skepticism validate their 
epistemological union.229 What remains is to explore the function of 
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context in the New Haven Jurisprudence with respect to its pragmatic 
war against foundationalism. 
 If jurisprudential approaches of the past failed the test of temporal 
relevance because of their scant regard for context and a false claim to 
context-transcendence through legal semantics, the configurative juris-
prudence of Yale is wary of a direct relationship between its relevance 
and context sensitivity.230 The scholar of policy-orientation leaves the 
high field of semantics for a more cumbersome and rewarding labor of 
self-observation through proper techniques and elements that are suf-
ficiently sensitive to the conditionality of time and space. She has the 
modesty of determining her own standpoint in search of objectivity, the 
vigilance of protecting her profession’s collective identity against the 
distortive influence of power, and the diligence of returning to the field 
of semantics only once she is armed with a fair understanding of prag-
matics. 
 While this summary is a fair description of what amounts to contex-
tual-orientation in policy science, further elaboration is in order. The 
first part of the argument below details the various functions of context 
in the Lasswell-McDougal oeuvre. As will be shown, context-sensitivity, in 
the final analysis, is to serve two purposes: a procedure to ensure ration-
ality and a conceptual tool against foundationalism. With this demon-
strated, I will reexamine the real function of the conceptual tool of con-
text in policy science against the backdrop of epistemic contextualism. 
A. Context, Rationality, Reflexivity, and Pragmatics 
 Although contextualism is central to the policy-oriented approach, 
it is difficult to find an articulate account of how precisely context safe-
guards inquiry from leaning on any variation of foundationalism. On 
its face, the demand of such an account may seem superfluous because 
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the contribution of particularities of context in transcending the limita-
tions of semantic foundationalism is self-evident. The NHS finds se-
mantic foundationalism to be the foremost reason for the failed ideal-
ism of both its contemporaneous and past approaches to international 
law and boasts context-sensitivity as the remedy for that failure for any 
jurisprudence that hopes to be relevant.231 Yet the obvious importance 
of considering the socio-political, historical, or economic particularities 
of each case in legal decision-making does not per se address how pre-
cisely such particularities respond to the insufficiency of the semantic. 
In a self-professedly value-oriented jurisprudence such as New Haven’s, 
normative values also make up part of the body of the context and so 
add yet another layer to the question around the role of context in 
overcoming gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in semantics. 
 Three understandings of contextual-orientation in policy science 
can be gleaned from the works of Lasswell and McDougal. The first two 
are specific to Lasswell’s policy sciences, and the third one is contextu-
alism as applied to the jurisprudence of international law. 
1. Contextual-Orientation and Rational Observation 
 According to Lasswell, the path of inquiry for the policy analyst is 
not a journey with a specific end in view, but rather a means to enhance 
the potential for enlightened action.232 Rational inquiry leading to en-
lightenment reads the meaning of details as part of a whole, the con-
ception of which is in turn constructed, revised, and disciplined 
through concrete evidence in a dynamic manner.233 The whole in each 
situation under investigation is made up of the socio-historical context 
of that situation in addition to value judgments specific to the particu-
lar analyst. To ensure rationality, the complex web of social interactions 
based on shared meanings and values “recognized and sustained in the 
continuing interplay among participants in the social process” must be 
considered both as an objective universe to face and as a context to 
penetrate by the analyst.234 The analyst undertakes a psychoanalytical 
examination of herself and the unfamiliar territory of the social process 
and considers the wider context than that which is apparent.235 Yet the 
familiar is under constant reexamination as well: “The whole aim of the 
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scientific student of society is to make the obvious inescapable”236 as 
“[t]he world about us is much richer in meanings than we consciously 
see.”237 
 Thus, for Lasswell, the conception of the “self-in-context” necessar-
ily links the analyst’s “insight” into one’s self with her knowledge of 
other people and a wider social context,238 as it is through an under-
standing of individual characteristics that are “ordinarily excluded from 
the focus of full waking attention by smooth working mechanisms of 
‘resistance’ and ‘repression’” that the inhibiting shadow of anxieties is 
dispelled and the light of rationality appears.239 As much as psychoana-
lytic observation of the self and “insight” into individual characteristics 
is important to remove blinders and render an understanding of social 
context possible in order to make the individual aware of her total insti-
tutional context and provide for contextual “insight” into social reality 
at different levels, traditional psychoanalytic technique must be 
adapted to “reality critique.”240 Rational observation is thus ensured by 
the analyst’s deep “insight” into the particular context of individual 
specificities which provide the lens through which the institutional con-
text is examined.241 
 Rational inquiry is also contextual in the sense that it is necessarily 
directional, that is, of a temporal, developmental dimension. Contex-
tual-orientation is to discern a totality which is not fixed in time, but 
involves both a stable configuration in a particular moment and a 
process of changing patterns in the form of historical development.242 
The “principle of temporality” requires that the policy analyst, as an 
actor within a changing context, adopt a “developmental construct” 
and draw an image of anticipated future developments based on past 
trends.243 Such a “developmental construct” is not bound to any laws of 
historical development, contrary to Marx to whom Lasswell acknowl-
edges a debt for this concept,244 but rather it is tentative and subject to 
                                                                                                                      
236 Id. at 250. 
237 Id. at 36. 
238 Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 155–57. 
239 See Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment, supra note 234, at 96–97. 
240 Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 158. 
241 See id. 
242 Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity 4–5 (1965) 
[hereinafter Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity]. 
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revision. Future events are “partly probable and partly chance” and no 
amount of knowledge of past trends and present evidence can totally 
eliminate uncertainty.245 
 Context-sensitivity not only enables the individual observer to see 
through her own individual characteristics and background that have 
had a pivotal formative influence on her observation, but also empow-
ers the analyst’s professional identity to stand free from the internal 
peculiarities of the observer or the external pressure of power. It there-
by becomes emancipatory by embedding itself in a professional outlook 
conscious of its limits and capabilities. 
2. Context-Sensitivity and Professional Reflexivity 
 The enlightened observer is inescapably, but only implicitly, con-
scious of her past, present, and future assumptions and the influence of 
her natural and cultural environment. To uplift that consciousness to 
the level of “undogmatic access to inclusive versions of reality,” there 
ought to be professional “policy training operations” that employ ap-
propriate procedures to make a full image of the total context available 
to the analyst.246 One example of such a procedure, according to Lass-
well, is to hold continuing seminars composed of highly committed 
members who willingly engage in a collective psychoanalytic technique 
of free association in which “uttering of uncensored suggestions” is en-
couraged.247 He suggests the appointment of a “devil’s advocate” in an 
adversarial model of seminars to challenge dominant predispositions 
and help unmask unrecognized demands, expectations, and identifica-
tions.248 Pursued seriously, a global network of such seminars to this 
end could be established.249 
 The reflexive labor of the analyst toward reducing constraints up-
on freedom and rationality of inquiry thus moves beyond “insight” into 
oneself, simultaneously demanding and reinforcing an institutional 
identity. The identity of rational policy science as such is defined by the 
analyst whose “insight” allows her to observe changes of social regulari-
ties alongside the changes of “current meaning,” which in turn lead to 
a transformation in the practical “context” of action.250 For rational 
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policy science to be effective, the analyst must possess a creative orien-
tation that allows her to at once detach from, and immerse into, the 
total context of social process with the mental flexibility to comprehend 
the process as one that both influences and is influenced by the ac-
tors.251 The principal goal of the enlightened policy analyst in under-
standing the social process is “truth”; a goal that cannot be simply pre-
sumed but must be adopted as a demanding commitment.252 This 
commitment is under constant threat by the distortive pressure of 
power and can be sustained only through individual efforts of the ana-
lyst as well as a cultivated professional identity for rational policy sci-
ence that supports a network of rational inquirers.253 
                                                                                                                     
 It is in the face of such circumstantial pressures and internal blind 
spots of personal and professional identity that Lasswell devises clear 
procedures to maintain contextual-orientation as a distinctive character 
of rational policy inquiry.254 Contextual-orientation is thus both an in-
dividual and a collective undertaking to enhance the rationality of pol-
icy analysis. 
3. Inadequacy of Semantics and Pragmatics of Context 
 A comprehensive orientation in policy science toward context 
arms the analyst—whose principal goal of seeking truth sets her apart 
from the typical policy actor—with the intellectual means for undog-
matic, rational policy analysis, free from the peculiarities of the per-
sonal identity and from the symbols or myths attached to professional 
identity. Translated to legal labor, the enlightening role of context is 
perhaps even more crucial, as the legal agent may act not just as the 
scholar to recommend sound decisions, but also as the actor entrusted 
with actual decision-making power. Contextual-orientation here en-
sures the rationality of such decisions in the sense of a closer approxi-
mation of community-approved value goals. 
 Legal semantics, devoid of determinate meaning, riddled with 
complementarity of propositions and conducive to normative-ambig-
uous prescriptions, falls short of the demands of a jurisprudence that is 
 
33–34 (Harold D. Lasswell & Daniel Learner eds., 1965) [hereinafter Lasswell, The World 
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251 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 155–56; Lasswell, 
World Politics and Personal Insecurity, supra note 242, at 4–6. 
252 Harold D. Lasswell, Some Perplexities of Policy Theory, 14 Soc. Res. 176, 181 (1974). 
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to remain relevant at any time.255 A policy-oriented jurisprudence of 
international law “[a]bjur[es] the metaphysical derivations and justifica-
tions” of normative prescriptions so characteristic of jurisprudential 
work and instead relies on an empirical study of the comprehensive 
context of the social process within which the prescription is to be 
made.256 Any syntactical derivation from past decisions and semantics of 
rules must be weighed against alternative derivations in terms of their 
practical consequences for the value goals most extensively shared by 
decision-makers and their constituencies.257 Exclusive focus on legal 
semologics or content (including semantics and syntactics) without a 
conscious appreciation of total context of their cause and effects (prag-
matics) bears the blame for much of the normative ambiguity and ir-
relevance of international law jurisprudence.258 
 Cognizant of the comprehensive web of essential variables affecting 
decisions (causes) and rational appraisal of the aggregate value conse-
quences of competing alternatives (effects), a policy-oriented interna-
tional law locates authoritative decisions within the social process of the 
interaction of a larger global community and smaller communities. Be-
cause of interdependency or “interdetermination and interdepend-
ence259 of peoples across state lines” as they seek to maximize values by 
utilizing institutions and affect resources, says McDougal, one can well 
speak (as he does interchangeably) of “world community process” or 
“world social process.”260 The world social process is defined by the pro-
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cess of sharing and shaping eight basic values (power, enlightenment, 
respect, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, and rectitude),261 the resolu-
tion of dispute over which may be accomplished within the world power 
process, that is, authoritative decisions with international effects that are 
enforced through severe deprivation or extreme indulgence.262 The 
world power process is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the interactions of 
the world community with its encompassed sub-communities.263 As 
such, to be entirely contextual, it is essential to adopt proper procedures 
that identify the source of decisions within this reciprocal interaction 
and their effects on the distribution of community values. 
                                                                                                                     
 Lasswell and McDougal introduce a quite sophisticated conceptual 
apparatus to structure inquiry into context.264 First, to avoid normative-
ambiguity, policy-oriented jurisprudence recommends a clear distinc-
tion between what calls for an authoritative decision, that is, specific 
events or value changes in social process precipitating conflicting 
claims, and the decision itself.265 These decisions have both short-term 
and long-term consequences for values. When some participants in the 
world social process are threatened or deprived of certain values result-
ing from the actions of others which they call illegal, they call upon the 
authoritative community decision-makers to apply certain prescriptions 
of international law to restore any lost values.266 By weighing the claims 
and counterclaims of the deprived and the depriver and interpreting 
the prescriptions the parties have invoked to foster their claims, they 
“invariably seek to make reasoned decisions by reference to common 
policy and shared interests.”267 
 
261 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 
188–90. 
262 See McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law, supra note 260, at 
166–67. 
263 The world power process, McDougal writes, 
may . . . be insightfully viewed as a complex hierarchy of power processes of var-
ying degrees of comprehension (global, hemispheric, regional, national, local), 
with the more comprehensive affecting “inward” or “downward” the less com-
prehensive, and the latter in turn affecting “outward” or “upward” the former. 
The metaphor of “nesting” tables or cups might be apt if such tables and cups 
could be conceived as being in process of constant interaction and change. 
Id. at 171. 
264 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 
21–38. 
265 See id. at 30–31. 
266 See McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law, supra note 260, at 
167–68. 
267 Id. at 168. 
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 Second, the legal scholar or decision-maker engages in a three-tier 
analysis of “values,” “phase,” and “conditions.”268 These categories pro-
vide a reasonably full access to the values contested, knowledge about 
participants with a claim over values, and the past, present, and future 
of value distribution in the world power process.269 Under the value 
category, McDougal holds that the observer or decision-maker ought to 
consider the events leading to claims, the actual claims made over val-
ues, and all decision alternatives in terms of their policy implications or 
value consequences.270 For instance, to distinguish between permissible 
and impermissible coercion, a context-sensitive approach should ask to 
what extent coercion was necessary to change the distribution of values 
and how comprehensive the parties’ objectives were (consequentiality), 
whether the coercion was to defend the established distribution of val-
ues or to change the existing setting (conservation or extension), and 
to what degree the contested values were inclusive or exclusive.271 
 In the phase analysis, inquiry is made into “features,” “elements,” 
or “aspects” of the process of any interaction through which men shape 
and share values.272 In addition to community or social processes as a 
whole, the value process, the process of legal or authoritative decisions, 
the analysis of events, and the claim and decision processes, there are 
seven categories that help dissect the specific features of each context. 
These are: participants (who acted in varying roles that culminated in a 
particular outcome?), perspectives (what were the expectations and 
value demands of participants and who did they identify with?), situa-
tions (where and under what conditions were the participants interact-
ing?), base value (what effective means were at the disposal of partici-
pants to achieve their objectives?), strategies (in what manner were this 
means manipulated?), outcome (what was the immediate result of this 
interaction for value allocation?), and finally, effect (what are the ef-
fects of different duration of the outcome of the interaction?).273 
 In the “conditions” or “conditions of context” analysis, McDougal 
often refers to a number of additional factors relating to the location of 
a particular context within the larger context of world power proc-
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ess.274 For example, some factors affecting the authoritative process of 
interpretation and application of international agreements include: 
changes in the relative strength of contending visions of world public 
order which commend persuasion or coercion as instruments of social 
change, changes in the composition of territorial communities affect-
ing the modalities of communication and common perception of 
meaning, changes in the technology of communication, and changes 
in strategies of cooperation in shaping and sharing values that may af-
fect expectations about future modalities of such cooperation.275 
 This sketch of the role of context in a configurative jurisprudence 
ardh ly does justice to the impressive precision with which a contextual-
oriented inquiry is de-limited by Lasswell and McDougal. So much has 
already been said that it is unrealistic to expect a successful application 
of such a complicated conceptual framework in practice. Even with a 
masterfully crafted design of details of the indices affecting context, the 
limitations of investigative resources hamper any attempts to account 
for all variables that cause decisions and consider their respective con-
sequences.276 A parsimonious selection of variables to account for, 
though perhaps far from the ideal image of a scholar, is more reason-
able for the practitioner of international law.277 McDougal’s proposal in 
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tation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and 
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ments and World Public Order]. 
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rles Lindblom. He rejects the recommendation to examine all the variables that give 
rise to specific decisions, or consider alternatives by way of investigation into their conse-
quences for aggregate values, as utterly unrealistic. He instead recommends that the goals 
in each decision-making process be limited to a few specific ones, and that a limited num-
ber of alternatives, which differ from one another only incrementally, be considered for 
the advancement of those goals. See, e.g., Charles Lindblom & David Braybrooke, A 
Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (1963); Charles Lind-
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277 Oscar Schachter writes about this from his own standpoint as a practitioner: 
This brings me to still another prejudice of the international official—one
which he probably shares with others in practical affairs—that is, a bias in fa-
vor of deciding questions with reasonable dispatch and facility. This, we real-
ize, is far from the ideal conception of a scholar. We have been told, for ex-
ample, that one must consider all the conditioning factors that affect 
decisions in the field of international law. . . . We have also been told that we 
must take into account future developments and the impact of various alter-
natives on the whole range of basic values. But surely if we attempted to fol-
low this counsel, even in small part, no decisions would ever be made on the 
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fact reaches the outer limits of empirical possibility by requiring inves-
tigators to deal with eight value categories and seven phase categories 
with attendant sub-categories, an open-ended list of conditions of con-
text, and five dispositional factors specifically related to scientific think-
ing (culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis). 
 Valid as this critique may be, the impossibly demanding nature of 
the empirical task is not the focus of this Article. The more interesting 
point is to illustrate how the empirical potential of the conceptual appa-
ratus of contextualism is indeed crippled under the shadow of a “postu-
lated” value system of human dignity. McDougal’s recommended inves-
tigation into the pragmatics of cause and effect boils down to a 
determination by a decision-maker of the balance of value systems and 
an appraisal of alternatives to those decisions.278 The role of law in the 
world power process is to ensure the conservation and expansion of the 
preferred value system of human dignity, and the recommended phase 
analysis with all its scrupulously defined subcategories must be utilized 
to that end. No doubt legal semantics is unable to live up to this task. 
But nothing in that suggests that the meaning of rules, as McDougal is 
convinced, is radically indeterminate. Contextualism can afford to offer 
an epistemic view within which meaning is determinable, if not invaria-
bly determinate. Pragmatics of context, therefore, is epistemically illu-
                                                                                                                      
complex issues of contemporary international life. From the point of view of 
a participant—if not of a scholar—we must have a reasonably manageable 
frame of reference; we must take account of the limits on our ability to obtain 
and organize information and to look into the future; we must, in conse-
quence, restrict our focus to relatively few variables and pay attention to per-
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minative of semantics. This is contrary to the policy-oriented approach 
of Lasswell and McDougal, under which legal semantics is irremediably 
indeterminate and indeterminable, and so disregarded and replaced 
with pragmatics.279 Ironically, the consequences of McDougal’s recom-
mended pragmatic context analysis in its most precise form are not con-
tingent on context, but instead guided by a set of non-reflective values 
or “preferred events” which themselves are not context-dependent.280 
They are thus no less unwarranted or rigid than what McDougal avoids 
in the foundationalism of semantics. 
B. A Re-Assessment of the Role of Context in Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence 
 -
tio
                                                                                                                     
As noted earlier, Lasswell and McDougal’s masterly detailed articu
la n of a conceptual framework for context-analysis triggered a good 
deal of skepticism, much of which related to the demanding empirical 
task involved.281 A more interesting critique of Lasswell’s original de-
sign of a framework for contextual-orientation, however, asks some dif-
ficult questions about the rationale behind devising the categories and 
sub-categories as introduced by policy science.282 This is particularly 
crucial with regard to the value category and its eight subsumptive sets 
of values which I will take up in the next part. Here, I intend to illus-
trate how, in the New Haven Jurisprudence, pragmatics neither com-
plements semantics nor in fact addresses occurring cases of semantic 
indeterminacy to provide interpretive remedy, but instead is substituted 
for semantics. Because, as will be shown, the value category in the last 
analysis outruns other categories in the McDougalian contextual appa-
ratus to find answers to legal cases, contextual-orientation is in effect 
tantamount to the preservation of values of human dignity. This, how-
ever, is nothing more than a trite observation regarding policy-oriented 
international law, known to any dilettante with the most cursory ac-
 
279 See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 268. 
280 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 
335–36. 
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Social Psychology, in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Cen-
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some concepts rather than others. Id. 
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quaintance with its value-oriented configurative jurisprudence. Fur-
thermore, the primacy of values of human dignity over all other con-
textual factors does not in and of itself negate the context-sensitivity of 
McDougal’s approach, though it certainly affects its efficacy. The prob-
lem appears only when such justifying values remain unjustified in a 
context-transcendent manner, betraying epistemic irresponsibility on 
the part of advocates of values of human dignity. The upshot is not only 
universalizing the particular, but more importantly, presenting answers 
to cases, hard or not, that are as predictable as any diehard literal read-
ing of semantics may produce. The examples below will demonstrate 
this point. 
 In a comprehensive series of four volumes on world public order, 
cDM ougal and his collaborators set a prime example of the level of so-
phistication involved in any contextual analysis.283 Applied to the gen-
eral jurisprudence of a particular doctrinal field, the grand task is no 
impediment to a “systematic”284 effort to capture various constituents of 
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ect matter does not lend itself to the application of conceptual categories, such as in 
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context by McDougal and his associates through the designated proper 
categories.285 This degree of comprehensive coverage of contextual 
categories, however, barely sustains when McDougal addresses specific 
cases in order to assess their legal status in practice.286 For instance, 
consider McDougal’s recommended contextual analysis of the lawful-
ness of coercion, in which the decision-maker ought to consider the 
events, claims, and decision alternatives to assess the short-term, mid-
dle-range, and long-term proposed or actual consequences for com-
munity values.287 Together with this is a consideration of the particular 
event leading to the claim under investigation so far as the phase cate-
gory and conditions of context are concerned.288 More concretely, 
when considering participants in an incident of coercion, their “fight-
ing capabilities, composition of internal elites, concentration of power 
in internal structures of authority, [and] ideological affiliation” are at 
stake.289 The decision-maker must take into account the participants’ 
objectives, the importance of the goals pursued (whether they bear ma-
jor or minor changes to the existing order), the expansion or conserva-
tion of values, and the sharability of values.290 The conditions of con-
text include some “more important factors of fairly obvious significance 
[for] . . . appraising lawfulness [of coercion] . . . expectations about the 
nature of the available technology of violence, and about the relative 
probabilities of effective community intervention, and the kind of pub-
lic order demanded by the respective participants.”291 McDougal di-
rects the decision-maker to inquire (1) not only into which participant 
fired the first shot, but also into whether such an act was justified under 
the circumstances; (2) into which participant accepted community in-
tervention more readily; and (3) into the “degree of conformity” that 
                                                                                                                      
McDougal’s discussion of the background “acts” relating to the width of territorial sea is 
not conducive to categorization. At other times, there is no analysis of the process of deci-
sion, and the claims are discussed merely insofar as what they entail. 
285 See, e.g., McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World 
Public Order, supra note 274, at 14–21 (dividing the context of international agreements 
into the following categories: participants, objectives, situations, base values, strategies, 
outcomes, effects, and conditions). 
286 See, e.g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 598–600 (discuss-
ing Article 51 in terms of customary rights instead of contextual analysis). 
287 See McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order, supra note 
187, at 820–23. 
288 See id. at 779–91. 
289 See McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority, supra note 277, at 235 (em-
phasis added). 
290 Id. at 235–36. 
291 McDougal & Feliciano, The International Law of War, supra note 271, at 183. 
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the decision-maker expects to secure if “a characterization of imper-
missibility” is to be made.292 
                                                                                                                     
 In response to Quincy Wright and other critics of the U.S. quaran-
tine of Cuba,293 McDougal argued for the legality of the quarantine 
based on a new interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter (Charter).294 While Wright argued that the United States was not 
responding to an “armed attack” and thus was not entitled to a defen-
sive use of armed force,295 McDougal scoffed at the strict interpretation 
of Article 51 by virtue of which the customary right of self-defense is 
limited to the actual cases of an armed attack.296 Invoking the “plain 
and natural” language of Article 51 quite curiously, McDougal accuses 
the proponents of a strict reading of Article 51 of “word-juggling” and 
“substitut[ing] for the words ‘if an armed attack occurs’ the very differ-
ent words ‘if, and only if, an armed attack occurs’.”297 McDougal re-
peated his earlier arguments for the right to anticipatory self-defense in 
Law and Minimum World Public Order to offer a different reading of Arti-
cle 51 reflecting the customary limitations of necessity and proportion-
ality on the right to self-defense298 and concluded: 
 
 
292 See id. at 206. 
293 See Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 546 (1963). For more 
on Professor Wright’s position, see also Quincy Wright, Non-Military Intervention, in The 
Relevance of International Law 5, 13 (Karl Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1971). 
294 McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 603. 
295 See Wright, supra note 293, at 560–61. 
296 See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 599. 
297 Id. at 600. Leo Gross turns this argument against McDougal, claiming that McDou-
gal himself could also rightfully be accused of word-juggling, as his comments could be 
read as follows: “Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence, if, but not 
only if, an armed attack occurs . . . .” Leo Gross, Problems of International Adjudication and 
Compliance with International Law: Some Simple Solutions, 59 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 53 (1965). 
298 See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 598. As McDougal puts it: 
The more important limitations imposed by the general community upon 
this customary right of self-defense have been . . . those of necessity and pro-
portionality. The conditions of necessity . . . have never . . . been restricted to 
“actual armed attack”; imminence of attack of such high degree as to pre-
clude effective resort by the intended victim to nonviolent modalities of re-
sponse have always been regarded as sufficient justification, and it is now 
generally recognized that a determination of imminence requires an ap-
praisal of an initiating state’s coercive activities upon the target state’s expec-
tations about the cost of preserving its territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence. Even the highly restrictive language of Secretary of State Webster 
in the Caroline case, specifying a “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation,” did not 
require “actual armed attack,” and the understanding is now widespread that 
a test formulated in the previous century . . . is hardly relevant to contempo-
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Even this impressionistic recall of some of the more salient 
features of the larger context of threat and response should 
suffice to suggest that a third-party observer, genuinely con-
cerned to clarify the common interests of all peoples, could 
reasonably conclude that the action taken by the United 
States was in accord with traditional general community ex-
pectations about the requirements of self-defense. The flow of 
pertinent comment and decision since the incident would in-
deed seem to confirm that this has been the overwhelming 
conclusion of world public opinion.299 
 The “impressionistic” examination of the larger context of the ne-
cessity and proportionality of the imposition of quarantine took into 
account the fact that the countermeasure was aimed against the U.S.S.R. 
and not against Cuba, and that, far from being egocentric, it was en-
dorsed by the Organization of American States (participants).300 While 
the Soviet objectives were expansionist, the United States was responsi-
ble for securing the elimination of nuclear weapons from Cuba.301 The 
general geographic area was of strategic concern to the United States 
and other countries in the hemisphere (situation), as historically ex-
pressed through the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, expectations of a 
crisis in the world arena were high and the estimates for an effective re-
sponse from the organized community of states were low.302 The out-
come of the Soviet’s act, almost within its reach, was a new, more direct 
military threat to the whole of the Americas, while the quarantine was a 
reversible action causing no irremediable destruction.303 It is true that 
none of these contextual factors are considered in comparison to the 
counterclaims of the adversary as a genuine contextual-oriented analysis 
would require and that McDougal’s drawing on geographically harmo-
nious foreign affairs interests in light of, inter alia, the Monroe Doctrine 
is simply ahistorical and, further, that the magnificence of the actual 
quarantine vis-à-vis the perceived threat is trivialized simply as “reversi-
ble.” What is more illuminating, however, is two-fold. 
                                                                                                                      
rary controversies, involving high expectations of violence, between nuclear-
armed protagonists. 
Id. 
299 Id. at 603. 
300 See id. at 601–02. 
301 See id. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 602–03. 
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 First, McDougal’s reliance on the language of Article 51 to justify 
the legality of the quarantine is highly curious.304 It is perhaps one of 
the reasons a reviewer once accused him of legalism with a “conserva-
tive turn of mind,” a characterization with which it is hard to quarrel.305 
As far as the interpretation and application of Article 51 to the Cuban 
crisis are concerned, however, McDougal makes no effort to employ the 
roster of contextual indices, drawn up impressionistically or not, to de-
termine the meaning of Article 51. Beyond word juggling or an other-
wise unwarranted assumption about the embodiment of anticipatory 
self-defense in Article 51,306 McDougal makes no use of a contextual 
approach to establish that the Charter did not in fact supersede the 
right to preemptive self-defense allegedly derived from custom. The 
contextual analysis is merely limited to the question of facts—whether 
the initial event was sufficient to give rise to a justified right to anticipa-
tory self-defense, given the participants, objectives and so on—and in 
no way extends to determine the meaning of Article 51.307 Notwith-
standing the semantics and application of Article 51, McDougal does 
not even apply the conceptual framework of context analysis to empiri-
cally verify the customary status of anticipatory self-defense. In fact, on-
ly two years before the Cuban quarantine, McDougal wrote of a need 
                                                                                                                      
304 Ironically enough, not even the U.S. government made any attempt to use Article 
51 to justify the Cuban quarantine. The State Department’s then-Deputy Legal Adviser, 
Leonard Meeker, later summarized the Government’s position as follows: 
[I]t may be noted that the United States, in adopting the defensive quarantine 
of Cuba, did not seek to justify it as a measure required to meet an “armed at-
tack” within the meaning of Article 51. Nor did the United States seek to sustain 
its action on the grounds that Article 51 is not an all-inclusive statement of the 
right of self-defense and that the quarantine was a measure of self-defense open 
to any country to take individually for its own defense in a case other than an 
“armed attack.” Indeed, as shown by President Kennedy’s television address of 
October 22[, 1962,] and by other statements of the Government, reliance was 
not placed on either contention, and the United States took no position on ei-
ther of these issues. 
Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 515, 523 (1963). 
305 See D.P. O’Connell, Book Review, 4 Sydney L. Rev. 318, 318 (1964) (reviewing 
Myres S. McDougal & F.P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The 
Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961) and Myres S. McDougal, 
Studies in World Public Order (1960)). Without elaborating further, O’Connell writes: 
“McDougal, despite all his social science language, and his dedication to relativism, is in 
fact excessively legalistic and of a fundamentally conservative turn of mind.” Id. 
306 See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 600. 
307 See id. at 602–03 (applying a contextual framework to the factual scenario of the 
Cuban crisis). 
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for “redefinition” or a less restrictive view of anticipatory self-defense,308 
and it is not clear how mysteriously such a broad view would gain wide-
spread recognition in the short term.309 It is worth noting that one may 
object to the distinction between questions of facts and law as contra-
dicting the basic principles of viewing law as a process of authoritative 
and controlling decisions—perhaps disguised positivism. Such an ob-
jection is without force, however, because it is precisely the absence of 
factual grounds in interpreting the law that renders McDougal’s project 
of contextual-orientation meaningless for legal interpretation.310 
                                                                                                                      
 
308 McDougal & Feliciano, The International Law of War, supra note 271, at 67. 
According to the authors: 
The traditional requirements imposed upon resort to self-defense—a realistic 
expectation of instant, imminent military attack . . . —may . . . require some 
redefinition to take into account the potentialities of the newer technology of 
violence. From this perspective, the emphasis in the United Nations Charter 
upon “armed attack” as the precipitating event for the legitimate recourse to 
self-defense may appear most unrealistic. 
Id. 
309 In fact, in her review of the U.N. debates about self-defense from its founding to 
1963, Rosalyn Higgins concludes that: 
In virtually all those instances where a right of anticipated self-defense has 
been specifically in issue . . . the United Nations has preferred not to give rein 
to the doctrine. This does not, however, warrant the assumption that Article 
51 has restricted this right as laid down in The Caroline; there has merely been 
a reluctance on the part of the United Nations to encourage it, for fear it may 
be too fraught with danger for the basic policy of peace and stability. 
Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political 
Organs of the United Nations 203 (1963). 
310 It is helpful here to compare, in some length, Richard Falk’s inquiry into the legal-
ity of the 1968 Israeli raid on the Beirut airport, during which Israeli soldiers destroyed all 
commercial aircraft belonging to Arab Airlines in retaliation for Arab commando actions 
against El Al Airline. See generally Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of 
Retaliation, 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 415 (1969). On the doctrinal level (the Charter and subse-
quent U.N. re-affirmations thereof), Falk asserts, “Israel is not entitled to exercise a right 
of [forcible] reprisal in modern international law.” Id. at 430. While the law “seems clear” 
on this point, he continues, “[s]uch clarity . . . serves mainly to discredit doctrinal ap-
proaches to legal analysis. International society is not sufficiently organized to eliminate 
forcible self-help in either its sanctioning or deterrent roles.” Id. This fact regarding the 
expectations of the “international society” ought to be considered when judging the legal-
ity of the Israeli actions. Falk thus draws on the precedent of February 1969, another Is-
raeli attack against Arab commando bases in Syria: 
Evidently, for instance, the attacks on the Syrian bases resulted in fairly large 
Arab casualties and yet failed to provoke any sense of international opposition 
to the Israeli action. An attack of this kind on bases seems well assimilated . . . 
into the structure of international expectations about tolerable levels of Arab-
Israeli violence, given current levels and forms of conflict and hostility. 
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 Second, though the value category occupies an independent 
framework alongside other categories in the McDougalian conceptual 
scheme for contextualism, it is hardly an overstatement to note that it 
in fact colonizes the implications of all the other categories in its nor-
mative grasp.311 The clearly articulated constituent elements of context, 
the identification of participants, the assessment of their objectives, 
perspectives, situations, base values, strategies employed, and outcome 
and effects, all take place on a bedrock of binary opposition between 
the universally sharable values of human dignity and the totalitarianiz-
ing values of human indignity.  The identification of a participant with 
either of the two dominant visions of world public order, and the char-
acterization of its objectives and perspectives and the effects of the 
claims and decisions simply leaves no room for a holistic understanding 
of context. No sooner is a participant identified on either side of the 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 420. So given public expectations about a tolerable level of violence in the Arab-
Israeli relationship, these expectations give rise to a valid second level of legal inquiry. As 
Falk puts it: 
As a technical matter, Charter law is properly accorded priority over inconsis-
tent rules of customary international law. . . . However, the inability of the 
United Nations to impose its views of legal limitation upon states leads to a 
kind of second-order level of legal inquiry that is guided by the more permis-
sive attitudes toward the use of force to uphold national interests that is con-
tained in customary international law. . . . Even second-order [level of] legal 
inquiry may be ill-adapted to the kind of retaliatory claim being made by Is-
rael . . . and a third-order legal inquiry involving the specification of consid-
erations bearing on the relative legal status of a particular retaliatory claim 
[may be necessary]. 
Id. at 430–31 n.39. On the third level of inquiry, Falk offers a set of indicators to assess the 
legality of Israeli claims, indicators (which are mainly specifications and adaptations of 
customary norms) that unlike customary norms, would “overcome[e] the dichotomy be-
tween war and peace, and would be more sensitive to the continuities of terroristic provo-
cation and retaliatory response such as are evident in the Middle East.” See id. at 435. Based 
on these indicators, Falk notes the Israeli Beirut raid as unreasonable and thus illegal. Id. 
at 439–40. 
 The difference between McDougal’s and Falk’s applications of “general public expec-
tations” as a contextual factor in assessing the legal status of an incident of coercion should 
be obvious. While Falk’s process-oriented approach has no difficulty severing the link be-
tween public expectations and the law of the Charter to suggest different orders of inquiry, 
McDougal’s invocation of the text of the Charter draws on facts on the ground not to de-
termine the meaning of Article 51 but to decide the urgency of preemption and then pro-
vide a Charter-based rationalization. Absent from the former is a clear articulation of the 
legal basis for lower levels of inquiry, as well as any regard for contextual interpretation of 
the existing law. The latter, however, is in sheer disregard of contextualism at the core of a 
policy-oriented international law. Neither one takes the elements of context affecting the 
interpretation of the law of Charter seriously. 
311 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 169. 
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value pole than the idea of holistic reasoning in context is nipped in 
the bud. None of this is to suggest that, in a sly rationalization of desid-
eratum, McDougal manipulates the conceptual apparatus of context to 
reach his favored policy consequences.312 Rather, the claim is that, tak-
en to its logical conclusion, the reign of value judgment over all other 
variables of context and the fixity of value demarcation in the policy-
oriented approach neither can nor does leave any hope for a genuinely 
contextual-oriented jurisprudence. 
 The rigidification of context is by no means limited to the law of 
the use of force. While rejecting international law jurisprudence on the 
termination of treaties for either overemphasizing consent or unrealis-
tically terminating agreements unilaterally, McDougal suggests an or-
ganization of “systemic inquiry into the prescription and practice by 
which the decision-makers of nation-states terminate . . .  agreements” 
that “distinguishes between termination which is based on mutual con-
sent and termination” based on the grounds of changed conditions.313 
An inquiry that is both cognizant of the past practice of the decision-
makers of nation-states and amenable to securing policy preferences 
should seek an “appropriate balance between the honoring of the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties to agreements . . . and the permitting 
or encouraging of a continual, progressive reformulation of policies to 
keep them in accord with the changing perspective and conditions of 
the parties.”314 On its face, the recommended balancing work between 
the “reasonable expectations” of the parties and the dynamic interrela-
tions of policy preferences could be best achieved in a comprehensive 
contextual framework of inquiry.315 But understanding that “reason-
able expectations” in international agreements are limited to those that 
are recognized as such by the interpreters in light of their compatibility 
with, and potential for, the advancement of values of human dignity,316 
                                                                                                                      
312 This is the critique Louis Henkin makes specifically regarding McDougal’s invocation 
of Article 51 in the case of Cuban quarantine. See Louis Henkin, Remarks, 57 Am. Int’l L. 
Proc. 147, 165–69 (1963). For a similar critique, see also Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of 
International Lawyers, 2 Int’l L. 591, 593–99 (1968) (discussing McDougal & Reisman, Rhode-
sia and the United Nations, supra note 42). Chimni goes so far as to suggest that “McDougal’s 
jurisprudence appears to give the impression of working itself backwards from this point, 
putting together elements which in combination can provide some form of intellectual ra-
tionalisation and justification for every action that the United States undertakes.” Chimni, 
supra note 151, at 140. 
313 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 211–12. 
314 Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
315 See id. at 211–12. 
316 See McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public 
Order, supra note 274, at 44. 
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the application of rebus sic stantibus cannot rest on a myriad of contex-
tual variables independent of the determinative consequences of the 
value bipolarity in the New Haven Jurisprudence. 
 Likewise, against the confusion surrounding the admission of new-
ly-emerged, territorially-organized political bodies to the arenas of for-
mal authority of existing nation-states, McDougal recommends a distinc-
tion between the facts to which decision-makers respond and the 
ensuing consequences of their response in order to rescue “recognition” 
from all the “normative-ambiguity” that surrounds it.317 A comprehen-
sive inquiry conducive to the clarification of the concept should first 
examine “what access official decision-makers . . . of newly emerged 
bodies politic have to established arenas of formal authority prior to 
ceremony of recognition and what new access to such arenas and other 
advantages they obtain after such ceremony.”318 An inquiry should also 
be made into “what policies in terms of legitimacy, constitutionalism, 
willingness to perform international obligations, and so on, the deci-
sion-makers in established nation-states have in fact sought and achieved 
in granting or withholding recognition in respect to newly emerged 
bodies politic.”319 Instead of focusing on the ceremony of recognition as 
the “outmoded survival of earlier power processes,” it is rational to de-
vise new collective modes of recognition based on “criteria compatible 
with an international law of human dignity.”320 In the process of estab-
lishing a collective mode of recognition, so the argument goes, the his-
tory of granting or withdrawing recognition and their resulting conse-
quences, as well as the effects resulting from each new act of 
recognition, must be evaluated in terms of their correspondence with 
the preferred values of human dignity.321 
 At times, it may seem that McDougal favors the process of contex-
tual interpretation not to respond to any semantic limitations of legal 
rules, but to ensure that the outcome of the process of legal decision-
making is taken seriously.322 What may seem to be a concern for foster-
ing compliance, however, is no more than a reductive employment of 
contextual flexibilities and confinement of the great potentials of con-
                                                                                                                      
317 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 197. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 198. 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
322 See, e.g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 601 ( juxtaposing 
concerns about acceptability of a strict reading of self-defense rights with concerns about 
minimizing coercion and violence). 
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text to the determinative demands of value judgment. McDougal’s view 
on the width of the continental shelf is a fine case in point. The Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf defined the shelf as the “seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the ar-
ea of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres . . . or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploi-
tation of the natural resources of the said areas,”323 McDougal criticized 
the precise “200 metre” standard and argued for the vaguer standard of 
“exploitability:” 
It is true that the outer limit placed upon the exploitability 
criterion is most imprecisely indicated by restricting applica-
tion of the standard to “adjacent” submarine areas; we do not 
share the curious view that the additional provision of the 200-
meter depth . . . remedies this imprecision . . . . The degree of 
vagueness in the exploitability criterion, deplored by all 
commentators, seems nevertheless much less likely to produce 
consequential tension than would a criterion which, while cer-
tain and precise, would also limit coastal authority to only part 
of an exploitable area.324 
 Contrary to the objections against McDougal for favoring open-
ended standards, all of which focus on the threat that a McDougalian 
framework would pose to the rule of law,325 it must be noted that the 
“exploitability” criterion could indeed reduce the possibility of “conse-
quential tension” by considering the changing exploitation capabilities 
of states. Such a standard is characteristically future-oriented and not 
captured in the past. This is in line with the objectives of a policy-
oriented international law that views experience of the past as a guide 
to wisdom about the future and yet expects the decision-makers to pro-
ject a distribution of values, in view of community goals, into the fu-
ture.326 Yet as characteristic as the future-orientation of the exploitabil-
                                                                                                                      
323 McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, supra note 95, at 685 
n.376. 
324 Id. at 687. 
325 See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning 
of International Law: An Intermediate View, in The Relevance of International Law, supra 
note 293, at 133, 140; Brownlie, supra note 105, at 1055; Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Law and 
Minimum World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano and Public World 
Order of the Oceans by Myres S. McDougal and W. T. Burke, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 614–15 
(1964) (book review); Quincy Wright, Studies in World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal and 
Associates, 39 U. Det. L.J. 145, 148 (1961). 
326 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 183–84. 
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ity standard is, it is over-determinative in application. A McDougalian 
decision-maker entrusted to project a distribution of values into the 
future consonant with community goals when interpreting and apply-
ing the exploitability standard in a particular case must take into ac-
count the participants, their objectives, perspectives, and situations, and 
the effects and outcomes of the distribution in question.327 With the 
bipolarity of value systems and the often ex ante assignment of partici-
pants and their objectives to either side of the pole, it is no longer a 
matter of contextual interpretation to predict how the exploitability 
standard would be used as a guide to determine cases in practice. 
 On other occasions, however, contextual interpretation addresses 
what McDougal identifies as normative-ambiguity surrounding the ap-
plication of rules.328 The application of Article 27(3) of the Charter to 
the Security Council Resolutions of June 1950 (Resolutions) condemn-
ing the Korean attack and authorizing the members of the United Na-
tions (U.N.) to furnish necessary assistance to the Republic of South 
Korea to repel the attack and restore international peace is an exem-
plary case in which McDougal criticized those who purported to find a 
“literal” “or “objective” meaning in Article 27(3).329 In a heated style, 
McDougal contends that commentators who find that the Soviet ab-
sence and lack of concurring vote renders the Resolutions invalid un-
derstand Article 27(3)’s provision that decisions of the Security Council 
on all matters other than procedural “shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the perma-
nent members” to mean “the concurring votes of all five permanent 
members, who must be present and voting.”330 Such commentators are 
guilty of the “fallacy of univocalism” by thinking that Article 27(3) has 
unambiguous meaning in no need of interpretation, and of the “fallacy 
of detailism” in trying to project “a minutely detailed intent into the 
future” where subsequent interpreters will give priority to that intent 
over more general objectives.331 
 In a characteristically inflated representation of the opponent, 
McDougal is here responding to an argument by Leo Gross, who, ra-
                                                                                                                      
327 See id. at 182–83. 
328 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 149–57 (dis-
cussing the limitations of “unambiguous meanings” in the context of North Korea’s attack 
on South Korea in 1950). 
329 See Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpreta-
tion for Survival, 60 Yale L.J. 258, 266–67 (1951) [hereinafter McDougal & Gardner, The 
Veto and the Charter]. 
330 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 149. 
331 Id. at 151–52. 
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ther than invoke a literal meaning for Article 27(3), in fact seeks to of-
fer an interpretation thereof that is compatible with the policies and 
purposes of the drafters as well as the history of the subsequent practice 
of the U.N.332 By making a distinction between abstention and absence 
and giving a privileged position to the principle of unanimity—which 
by virtue of established practice, and in fact contrary to a strict reading 
of the Charter, has been understood not to be tarnished by absten-
tion—Gross is after a purposive interpretation of Article 27(3).333 He 
seems to give equal weight to the original intent334 and the evolution of 
the relevant practice of the U.N. members to conclude that the inter-
pretation of Article 27(3), “like other such questions which have arisen 
in the past, . . . is believed to be susceptible of objective and judicial de-
termination.”335 This, of course, is different from what McDougal con-
siders to be the defect in the argument against the legality of the Reso-
lutions, namely, the underlying “assumption that the words of Article 
27(3) have an ‘unambiguous’ meaning which makes their interpreta-
tion unnecessary.”336 McDougal’s charge derives from his skepticism 
about “ordinary meaning,” a skepticism about whose implications he 
nevertheless remains inconsistent.337 It is fair to say that McDougal’s 
                                                                                                                      
 
332 See Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from 
Meetings, 60 Yale L.J. 209, 209–11 (1951). 
333 See id. at 256. Gross argues: 
This principle [of unanimity] is satisfied, of course, by an affirmative and 
concurring vote—that is by express consent to the proposed Security Council 
action. It is also satisfied by abstention—that is by tacit consent to the Council 
action. It is not satisfied when there is neither express nor tacit consent to the 
proposed Council action. . . . The same cannot be said of absences. 
Id. 
334 Id. (concluding that interpretations of Article 27(3) that equate absence with ab-
stention find very little support in the Article’s text or history). 
335 Id. at 257. 
336 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 151. 
337 McDougal seems to accept the implications of “ordinary meaning” when he says: 
Unless persuasive evidence is established to the contrary, assume that the 
terms of an agreement are intended to be understood as they are generally 
understood by the largest audience contemporary to the agreement to which 
both parties belong. The probabilities are that the more people who share a 
meaning, the more likely the particular parties are to have had that meaning. 
McDougal, et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order, 
supra note 274, at 59. Elsewhere, he notes: 
Unless there are excellent grounds for the view that some idiosyncratic mean-
ing was shared by the agreement-makers, the community decision-maker is 
justified in adopting, preliminarily, the ordinary usages that were current in 
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search for the purposes of the provision under controversy looks into 
the present and future of the U.N. and its survival, whereas Gross han-
kers after such purposes as established at the time of the drafting and 
evolution of the Charter.338 The divide is less a difference in their re-
gard for context than it is a difference considering context both as it is 
already shaped and as it ought to be shaped by appropriate policy 
choices. 
 Neither this particular controversy nor the aptitude of McDougal’s 
depiction of his opponent as oblivious to context need detain us any 
longer. Nor are we concerned with a consideration of McDougal’s rejec-
tion of “ordinary language,”339 beyond noting that in this case, as in the 
Cuban quarantine, his censure of misreading the text is at best curious. 
One should ask, what if Article 51 of the Charter did in fact read “if, and 
only if, an armed attack occurs,” or Article 27(3) in fact read, “the con-
curring votes of all five permanent members, who must be present and 
voting?” If semantics cannot afford to furnish any degree of closure un-
der any circumstances, why does McDougal still take the trouble of word 
juggling at all? Whatever ambivalence there may be about dispensing 
with the text altogether, the crucial point is that the considerations of 
context are not supposed to bear any relevance to determining the se-
mantics of the text.340 What McDougal hopes to make persuasive is: 
[T]hat the language of Article 27(3) can dictate no particular 
interpretation and that any decision about the constitutionality 
of the Korean resolutions, whether for or against, must de-
pend upon policy choices—and policy choices that may be 
made with varying degrees of consciousness and, hence, also 
with varying degrees of rational consideration of relevant factors.341 
                                                                                                                      
the appropriate audiences. . . . When private parties enter into arrangements 
that they expect to make effective in case of dispute by involving the decision-
makers of the community, it is reasonable to ask that they employ words with 
“public” rather than esoteric significations. 
Id. at 69. 
338 Compare McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 152 (con-
cluding that “the words of an international agreement cannot be taken as timeless abso-
lutes” but must be contextualized), with Gross, supra note 332, at 251–53 (examining the 
discussions surrounding Article 27(3) at the San Francisco Conference to draft the U.N. 
Charter). 
339 For an interesting critique of McDougal’s rejection of “ordinary meaning” and his 
behavioristic theory of semantics that views reality as non-verbal, see Chimni, supra note 
151, at 83–99. 
340 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 155. 
341 Id. (emphasis added). 
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“Rational consideration of relevant factors” could indeed guide the inter-
preter to vistas of the future where relevance of the law survives the pas-
sage of time, but this could happen only if it is not pigeonholed in an 
unjustified bipolar evaluative framework. To McDougal, the legality of 
the Resolutions is a matter of “interpretation for survival,”342 but at the 
time, one could just as well have put on the table other possibilities for 
consideration—whether unanimity would not be more germane to the 
survival of the U.N., for instance. The threshold of inquiry, however, 
was cut too short to give way to such questions, as the divide between 
the two poles of values painted a natural face to much of what was well 
in need of justification. 
 Overall, McDougal expects the contextualist framework to address 
three kinds of indeterminacy.343 The first relates to his rejection of “or-
dinary meaning” —rules come in words, and words possess no “ordi-
nary meaning.”344 The second class, which is the most interesting of all 
but is not discussed here, derives from complementarity of norms or 
concepts—norms come in pairs of opposites.345 Finally, regardless of 
these two cases, a rule must be tested each time afresh for conformity 
to the expectations of parties through empirical methods of social sci-
ence (such as content analysis, mass interviews, and participant obser-
vation).346 McDougal draws no distinction between different causes of 
indeterminacy when recommending a policy-oriented, contextualist 
framework.347 It must be assumed, therefore, that a policy-oriented 
scholar or decision-maker does not employ contextual factors to ad-
dress indeterminacy understood as a matter of degree, but rather taken 
as an inclusively pervasive character of meaning. Nor is she to apply any 
sorts of discrimination in selecting the relevant contextual factors or 
their application based on the specific source of indeterminacy in a 
                                                                                                                      
342 McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter, supra note 329, at 258. 
343 Id. at 263–69. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. at 266–68. 
346 See McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public 
Order, supra note 274, at xviii. The authors note: 
The approach which seeks genuine shared expectations does not neglect the 
words of a purportedly final text, if any exists. It does, however, regard any in-
itial version of their relation to shared expectations as provisional, and re-
quires that the interpreter engage in a course of sustained testing and revi-
sion of preliminary inferences about the pertinent subjectivities. And of 
course this calls for scrutiny of the whole context of communication. 
Id. 
347 See id. 
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particular case. What is certain is that in none of the cases, regardless of 
the specific source of indeterminacy, are contextual indices used by 
McDougal to help interpret the text (which may after all be considered 
as the original point in the process of interpretation).348 Instead, they 
are used to (re)construct a factual ground which will in turn serve to 
justify the desired, ad hoc application of a rule or standard. 
 To take stock, I am pursuing a two-fold argument with no parity of 
emphasis. The first, and less cardinal one to the overall thesis about the 
crippled contextualist claims of the NHS, is an argument about a com-
plete disjunction between pragmatics and semantics in McDougal’s 
scheme of contextual interpretation. The second, and central argu-
ment to the critique of the NHS’s contextualism, seeks to expose the 
(over-)determinative role of the value category in McDougalian contex-
tualism, and thereby, to reveal the futility of its sophisticated conceptual 
framework. 
 On the relationship between semantics and pragmatics in the con-
textual framework designed by policy-oriented jurisprudence, despite 
his self-avowed skepticism about the possibility of inferring any deter-
minate meaning from the text, a great deal of ambivalence could be 
detected in McDougal’s treatment of language of the law.349 Even in 
cases where he finds that the text is a good starting point, McDougal 
does not find it necessary, in theory or in practice, to employ contex-
tual factors to determine a meaning for the text with any minimal con-
sideration of the text itself.350 Instead, a series of contextual indices is 
used to construct a factual situation which is then considered to de-
mand a particular (and consistently predictable) reading of the text.351 
Contextual factors are used to construct, rather than establish, a factual 
situation, as the value category is largely determinative of the overall 
                                                                                                                      
348 See id. at 97. The authors point out: 
Although there is no reason to deny the usefulness of the common or public 
meanings of words as starting points in the process of interpretation, whenever 
a principle emphasizing such meanings threatens to become transformed into a 
final, exclusive procedure, it must be rejected. No acceptable justification can 
be given for precluding an interpreter, whose goal is to determine the shared 
expectations of the authors of a document, from proceeding to examine all of 
the relevant features of the context prior to final decision. 
Id. 
349 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 94–95. 
350 Cf. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 599–603 (analyzing Ar-
ticle 51 of U.N. Charter in light of customary self-defense rights and the factors of a single, 
contextualized situation). 
351 See, e.g., id. at 601–03. 
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structure of the facts as presented.352 As soon as the events and claims 
under investigation are assessed against the bipolar value category, the 
factual situation is by and large constructed around the result of that 
assessment, leaving little room for any further significant interpretive 
labor.353 
 Pragmatics, however, need not be severed from semantics in a con-
text-sensitive interpretive practice. Outside a foundationalist zone 
where one does not expect to find the comfort of semantic foundations 
to make meaning fully determinate, the work of interpretation makes 
use of pragmatics to find contingent, contextually determined seman-
tics from within, rather than without, language. 
 On the (over-)determinative role of the values of human dignity in 
McDougal’s design of contextual-orientation, a bipolar evaluative cate-
gory permeates the whole enterprise of contextual analysis with conse-
quences fatal to a project of contextual-orientation. The reasoning of a 
decision-maker or scholar in any number of particular cases follows a 
consistent pattern: first constructing the facts based on contextual cat-
egories, dominant among which is the value category, and then consid-
ering the optimum decision or recommendation as one that would best 
maintain and advance values of human dignity. In this process, before 
the investigative analysis of all the potentially relevant contextual fac-
tors begins, it is foreclosed by a predictable assignment of those ele-
ments to either side of the evaluative divide between human dignity 
and indignity. Consequently, the entire detailed design of contextual 
categories is certain to lead to inordinately predictable results. 
 This over-determination of legal analysis is more striking if one re-
calls the unjustified status of the values of human dignity and their asso-
ciation with Western liberal democracies against totalitarianism of the 
East. The preservation of the interests of the United States and its West-
ern allies in the New Haven Jurisprudence does not presage the vanish-
ing predictive power of law in the way it has occupied much of the cri-
tiques of Yale’s policy-oriented jurisprudence.354 It is not a threat to the 
                                                                                                                      
 
352 See, e.g., id. (contrasting the “totalitarian character” of the Soviet Union with the “de-
mocratic internal structures” of the United States to frame the discussion of the quarantine). 
353 See, e.g., id. at 603 (“Even this impressionistic recall . . . of the larger context of 
threat and response should suffice to suggest . . . that the action taken by the United States 
was in accord with . . . the requirements of self-defense.”) 
354 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 45, at 382. Anderson boldly objects: 
The words of the law become mere wisps of sight or sound. Law is policy. Pol-
icy is human dignity. Human dignity is fostered in the long run by the success 
of American foreign policy. Therefore, law is the handmaiden of the national 
interest of the United States. . . . Law becomes merely an increment to power. 
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stability or predictability of international law in a world of competing 
interests. On the contrary, it makes policy-oriented decision-making as 
predictable as, if not more than, semantic foundationalism. The prob-
lem thus lies in the over-determinacy of policy analysis, rather than in 
the oft-deplored indeterminacy of law in the policy-oriented jurispru-
dence. 
 Against the claim that the over-determinacy of policy analysis is the 
logical conclusion of the unjustified epistemic status of values of human 
dignity and the centrality of those values in McDougal’s contextual 
framework of inquiry, one could anticipate two valid questions. First, 
how could providing justification for normative values of human dig-
nity precisely remedy the over-determinative implications of “rational 
considerations of relevant factors” in a policy-oriented jurisprudence of 
international law? Second, what modes of inquiry are available for a 
pragmatic, problem-oriented jurisprudence of international law to seek 
justification for normative values in a non-foundational yet cognitive 
state? 
 Epistemic justification of values of human dignity in a manner 
compatible with the overall contextualist framework of a policy-oriented 
international law would impact both the inventory of values represented 
as indices of human dignity and the modality in which various partici-
pants in the world arena are seen to respect and adhere to, or violate 
and deny, such values. Grounded in context, relevant values may vary 
according to the context in use. The list, for instance, may exceed an 
arbitrary set of the eight preferences of the NHS. It may include devel-
opment as a value when economic and social rights are concerned, or 
the equality of access, rather than security, as a value when hydrogen 
bomb testing was questioned;355 or, it may include the equilibrium of 
military means on a large scale when the relationship between the legal-
ity of the use or threat of nuclear weapons and military necessity is in 
question. It may even include reproductive rights, contrary to McDou-
gal’s (or rather McNamara’s) unfounded Neo-Malthusian thesis about 
the growth of population as the greatest threat to human rights.356 In 
                                                                                                                      
 
Id. 
355 See generally McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, supra note 37, at 686. 
McDougal justified the legality of the hydrogen bomb test in the high seas with an argu-
ment for security given the threat posed by totalitarianism. 
356 See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human 
Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of 
Human Dignity 40 (1980) [hereinafter McDougal et al., Human Rights and World 
Public Order]. The authors quote McNamara: 
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the same way that the values relevant to policy-making in a particular 
context may vary from those relevant in another context, a contextually-
grounded normative framework of inquiry cannot capture the relation-
ship between participants in the world arena and values of human dig-
nity in a binary opposition without proper empirical investigation—an 
investigation which would perhaps establish fidelity to such values as a 
matter of degree.357 Contrary to McDougal’s contextual framework of 
inquiry where a set of predetermined postulated values in practice de-
fines the totality of the context in question, values grounded in context 
work holistically in relation to other contextual categories to render a 
meaningful configurative policy analysis possible.358 
 Having evaluated McDougal’s promises of contextualism, I now 
turn to the second pragmatist claim of the NHS—problem-solving ori-
entation—to see how it fares in relation to the normative commitments 
of Lasswell and McDougal. 
IV. The New Haven Jurisprudence and Problem-Oriented 
International Law 
 The previous Part attempted to link the central position of human 
dignity in policy science to its contextualist framework of inquiry. I sug-
gested that the unjustified status of values at the center of the policy-
oriented jurisprudence fatally blunts the contextualist edge of inquiry 
so much so that the considerations of those values over-determine the 
results of decision-making in a predictable manner unrivaled by seman-
tic foundationalism. In this part, I address the question of the impact of 
the normative goals of the New Haven Jurisprudence on its pragmatist, 
problem-oriented method of inquiry. I will consider the relationship 
between goal or value clarification with other intellectual tasks recom-
mended to the policy science analyst to demonstrate how the NHS’s 
treatment of human dignity adversely affects the performance of those 
intellectual tasks. 
                                                                                                                      
The end desired by the Church and by all men of good will is the enhance-
ment of human dignity.  That is what development is all about. Human dig-
nity is threatened by the population explosion—more severely, more com-
pletely, more certainly threatened than it has been by any catastrophe the 
world has yet endured. 
Robert McNamara, One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People: The Dimensions 
of Development 46 (1973), quoted in McDougal et al., Human Rights and World 
Public Order, supra. 
357 See Young, supra note 43, at 69. 
358 See id. 
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 While the futility of contextual-orientation in policy science, as was 
argued, is the logical conclusion of the over-determinative role of the 
epistemically unjustified value category, it is in fact the performance 
rather than the nature of the recommended intellectual tasks, as evi-
denced by McDougal’s work, which contradicts pragmatic methods re-
quired for a policy-oriented jurisprudence. If McDougal had properly 
employed any of his own recommended intellectual tasks to corrobo-
rate the factual or normative assumptions underlying the New Haven 
Jurisprudence, each of the tasks could potentially have aided a prob-
lem-solving approach to the world social process. Once the grip of the 
postulated value goals on the operation of the NHS’s recommended 
intellectual tasks is exposed, the urge for a pragmatic method of in-
quiry into the justification of normative values presents itself as an al-
ternative difficult to escape. 
 To avoid the confusion caused by the complementarity and ambi-
guity inherent in conventional legal rules, a policy-conscious scholar or 
decision-maker must take up a series of intellectual tasks to conduct a 
configurative inquiry into any problem under consideration.359 In a 
policy-oriented inquiry, the performance of these tasks need not follow 
a rigid order isolating the tasks from one another.360 When studying 
specific questions in context, the policy analyst must employ a configu-
rative approach to synthesize the results compelled by the performance 
because each operation draws upon a particular set of skills.361 The five 
intellectual tasks developed by Lasswell and adopted by McDougal de-
fine the method of inquiry in a directional fashion by postulating a 
normative vision for the social world, scientifically assessing the de-
mands and conditions for its realization, investigating the historical 
trends relevant to its formation, and projecting a future in which either 
the envisioned worldview is realized, or barring that, a viable alternative 
vision takes over.362 A vertical thread, however, seems in practice to run 
through these various modes of inquiry, shaping up the scientific, his-
torical, and developmental thinking according to the demands of goal 
postulates. Liberal optimism, if not determinism, infused into the pol-
icy-oriented intellectual tasks, thus, leaves but a chimera of scientific 
and historical modes of investigation. 
                                                                                                                      




362 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 39. 
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A. Goal Clarification 
 At a time when fundamentalism and localism present a real obsta-
cle to intercultural value clarification, the scholar and decision-maker 
of international law ought to act differently from elites of smaller 
communities who have historically concealed their normative goals in 
the obscurity of natural law or “mysticism of historicism or scien-
tism.”363 The policy-oriented jurisprudence, conscious of the fact that 
the artifact of law is used instrumentally for social change or stability, 
requires that the driving goals for the pursued social consequences be 
clarified in unequivocal terms.364 It requires that the observer or deci-
sion-maker use a secular technique to clarify the values they envision to 
be actualized in an ideal social structure in the future.365 Although goal 
clarification hardly dispenses with the wisdom of the past altogether, 
because veneration of the past could forestall a vision of change, the 
policy-oriented approach rules out “obsessive retrospectivity” in favor of 
a variety of methods such as disciplined imagination” and even “free 
fantasy techniques.”366 Whatever technique is in use, the overall goals 
must be clarified from a universal, as opposed to parochial, observa-
tional standpoint and in an empirical, rather than trans-empirical, fash-
ion.367 When “instant Armageddon” is no longer a mere fancy, a policy-
oriented approach to international law must adopt the goal of mini-
mum order in order to minimize unauthorized coercion, even though 
minimum order is always pursued with a view of giving the best ap-
proximation to other, more ambitious, social goals.368 The goals of “op-
timum order” are the overriding goals of human dignity values, the 
shared desiderata in the global community.369 
 Minimum order is attainable when the overarching values of the 
worth and dignity of man are realized.370 How precisely the abundance 
of values of dignity are widely shared in a community reduces the hap-
penstance of conflicts is what policy science takes to be self-evident. The 
presumed, rather than established, link between peace and security on 
the one hand, and the realization of the dignity of man on the other, is 
                                                                                                                      
363 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 
197. 
364 See id. at 197–98. 
365 Id. at 197. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 198. 
368 See id. 
369 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 198. 
370 See id. 
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nonetheless the outer layer of a deeper American creed—a pragmatic, 
liberal faith in necessary progress. It is this faith, rather than disguised 
natural law residua or merely some ad hoc arbitrary imposition of dis-
cretion, that ultimately explains the unreflective status of values in the 
New Haven Jurisprudence. 
 Not all readers of McDougal who are critical of the status of values 
of human dignity at the center of his jurisprudence, and certainly not 
McDougal himself, would agree. McDougal insists that the enlightened 
intellectual or decision-maker is one who consciously defines her ob-
servational standpoint and accordingly clarifies or postulates goal val-
ues not based on “faith” or “logical (syntactical) systems [which] are 
ambiguous in empirical reference unless they are explicitly related to 
observation,” but rather by empirical verification.371 The epistemic im-
plications of the inquirer’s standpoint will be most manifest and con-
sidered in scientific thinking. McDougal strives to maintain a compre-
hensive naturalism of discourse by an overbearing emphasis on the 
importance of eschewing logical or trans-empirical methods and adopt-
ing empiricism to establish value postulates.372 The NHS, however, fails 
to offer any considerable exemplar of an empirical inquiry into its goal 
postulates. 
 To avoid an absolute or a priori system of value-variables, McDou-
gal vehemently insists on an ever-increasing, common trend of rising 
demands for certain values worldwide, manifested in the national con-
stitutions as well as the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights.373 Given that these demands are made in “different levels 
of abstraction and with little systematic ordering,” the intellectual task 
of goal clarification must use the highest level of systematization (eight 
value categories) which is comprehensive and applicable to any particu-
lar context by using appropriate “operational indices.”374 Yet the high 
level of systematization of the eight categories has not been supple-
mented with additional values throughout McDougal’s work such that 
                                                                                                                      
371 See 2 id. at 759–63. 
372 See 1 id. at 315. 
373 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 198; Myres S. 
McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 Nat. L.F. 
72, 77 (1956); Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C.K. Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World 
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 Yale L.J. 60, 61 (1949) (“It is for 
values such as these [eight values] that men have always framed constitutions, established 
governments, and sought that delicate balancing of power and formulation of fundamen-
tal principle necessary to preserve human rights against all possible aggressors, govern-
mental and other.”). 
374 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 189. 
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the list would no longer be exhaustive,375 in the same way that opera-
tional indices have done little more than apply the eight staple value 
categories to a particular discourse. So despite an empirical façade,376 
systematization remains little more than the categorization of abstract 
preferences, indices little more than the translation of such preferences 
in context, and goal clarification tantamount to a declaration of fidelity 
to certain values. Read in this light, goal clarification is therefore more 
a psychoanalytical exercise for the inquirer than an epistemic obliga-
tion. 
 Lasswell and Kaplan make a stronger claim that these desired 
events are common to human nature, though different cultures afford 
them varying degrees of importance: “No generalizations can be made a 
priori concerning the scale of values of all groups and individuals. What 
the values are in a given situation must in principle be separately deter-
mined for each case [through specific empirical inquiry].”377 Except for 
citing a few domestic and international manifestos, hardly any empirical 
inquiry has been carried out to support the claim that there is a univer-
sal demand for the eight chosen values or to justify an assumption of 
parity in their desirability as constitutive of a democratic society.378 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
375 See id. McDougal notes: 
The highest level systemization and description we have proposed is in terms 
of the eight values: power, respect, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, af-
fection, and rectitude, and we have offered brief, initial definitions. By the 
giving of further appropriate operational indices to these terms, they may be 
made both completely comprehensive and sufficiently detailed for any par-
ticular investigation. 
Id. 
376 As Arthur Brodbeck puts it when speaking of the absence of scientific warrant in 
policy science’s value system: 
[T]he resulting set of abstract terms does not strike us as authoritatively bind-
ing for science. Since it is possible to smuggle in hidden postulates by the way 
one chooses Categories to form a set . . . . Many feel, for instance, that it is 
wrong to see legal institutions as more highly governed by “power” than by 
“rectitude,” or to see art as more highly governed by “skill” than by “enlight-
enment” (bypassing as this does the whole history of the idea of beauty in 
human affairs), or to see religion as more governed by “rectitude” than it is 
by a sense of love that clearly does not fit into any one of the categories, cer-
tainly not the category of “affection” as formulated. 
Brodbeck, supra note 282, at 245. 
377 Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society, supra note 243, at 56. 
378 As Terry Nardin suggests: 
The clarification of values is supposed to be a purely empirical activity uninflu-
enced by preconceived moral principles, but at the same time certain values are 
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NHS’s claim to a natural view of ethics lacking a proper, warranting em-
pirical inquiry, it must be noted, is not unique to policy science. Nor 
does it in and of itself confirm traces of natural law or arbitrary prefer-
ences of the masters of Yale’s jurisprudence. To find marks of natural 
law in the New Haven Jurisprudence would demand a canvassing of the 
intellectual background and heritage of its founders—a task yet to be 
fulfilled by any critic of New Haven’s jurisprudence. The accusation of 
arbitrary preferences, however, derives from a negation rather than an 
affirmation because most critics find themselves bound to conclude that 
absent any justification for values, they must be the result of some arbi-
trary preferences of Lasswell and McDougal.379 
                                                                                                                      
 
excluded from the empirical canvas because they are morally offensive. The 
contradiction is evident. Policy-oriented jurisprudence must be guided by values 
that are neither transcendentally derived nor, McDougal’s own evidence and 
arguments suggest, universally shared. In the end, therefore, the value of hu-
man dignity is simply, postulated. 
Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States 204 (1983); see Julius 
Stone, Approaches to the Notions of International Justice, in The Future of the Legal Order 
372, 450 (Richard Falk & Cyril Black eds., 1969) (arguing that the real difficult choice 
between values arises for the decision-maker just when the list has been offered, as not all 
the values could be equally secured either in general or in a particular context). 
379 This is not to discount the valuable insights offered by some of the critical assess-
ments of the NHS’s value system. The most sophisticated of these accounts is presented by 
David Little in Toward Clarifying the Grounds of Value-Clarification: A Reaction to the Policy-
Oriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 451 (1974). Little begins 
with the reasons Lasswell and McDougal give for the essential importance of value clarifi-
cation, that is, to facilitate the implementation of these values as constitutive of a democ-
ratic commitment, and to ensure rationality in decision-making—what McDougal calls “the 
quest for ‘rationality.’” McDougal, International Law and Social Science, supra note 86, at 80. 
Given that Lasswell and McDougal deliberately refrain from offering any justification for 
what they introduce as values of human dignity, Little believes these values could be taken 
either as mere postulates lying beyond rational justification, or as self-justifying or self-
evident. In the former case, supplying rational justification for values is impossible and 
irrelevant; in the latter case, while further justification would be useful, it would only illu-
minates why such values are self-justifying and thus unavoidable. See Little, supra, at 453. 
Little finds evidence for fluctuating between these two positions in policy science, but he 
unequivocally adopts the latter view, arguing for a strong link in the New Haven Jurispru-
dence between self-evident values of human dignity and rationality, in the sense that since 
these values guarantee a space for decision-making free from frustration or coercion and 
provide the widest distribution of free choice and dignity, their adoption is considered to 
be necessary or unavoidable for any rational decision-maker. See id. at 454. 
The ingenuity of Little’s analysis is in linking the status of values to an important dis-
tinction that Lasswell, and thus McDougal, makes between principles of content and prin-
ciples of procedure. Principles of content relate to the objects and states of affairs desired 
by individuals as a result of dispositional and environmental factors, and are not subject to 
rational justification. The content of values is a causal and not a rational matter; it would 
be a mistake to try to justify rationally what is empirically or accidentally determined. See 
id. at 455. Individuals can control these values first by distancing themselves from the val-
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 The NHS’s evasion of the justification of values can best be under-
stood when read against the flaws plaguing Dewey’s pragmatic view of 
value and ethics.380 In an attempt to break away from a fact/value dis-
tinction and at the same time reject the “empirical theory of values” 
which takes what is enjoyed and a value to be one and the same, Dewey’s 
concern is to distinguish between de facto and de jure statements, that is, 
between the desired and the desirable.381 If “X is desirable” is to be tak-
en as a de jure statement, it would have to mean “X ought to be desired”, 
rather than merely “X is consistently desired.”382 Morton White believes 
that Dewey’s naturalist view has not been successful in showing how “X is 
desirable” possesses any more de jure quality than “X is desired.”383 White 
reads Dewey to suggest that the distinction between “a report of imme-
diate sensation” and “an objective property of a thing” finds an analogue 
in value judgments as well.384 Therefore, as in the statements, “X looks 
red to me now,” “X is (really) red,” and “X is really red = for any normal 
person Y, if Y looks at X under normal conditions, X looks red to Y”, in 
value judgments the analogue to such statements would be: “X is desired 
by me now,” “X is really desirable,” and “X is desirable = for any normal 
person Y, if Y looks at X under normal conditions, X is desired by Y.”385 
White convincingly questions if the third sentence in each pair has any 
more de jure quality than the second ones—that is, whether X being de-
sirable to Y under normal conditions gives any sharper normative edge 
to X being really desired.386 If “X is desirable” is no more de jure than “X 
                                                                                                                      
ues and consciously clarifying them, and then manipulating them toward the realization of 
preferred events by a systematic operationalization of their content. This is performed by 
using principles of procedure that are entirely rational. See id. at 456. Little uncovers a 
confusion in Lasswell and McDougal’s language and argues that the principles of rational-
ity cannot intelligibly be said to be empirically grounded, because those principles should 
stand as the frame of mind that “is imposed on the empirical data in order to make sense of 
it.” Id. at 457. Further, to the extent that value judgments are constituted based on princi-
ples and conditions of rationality, they also cannot be seen as empirically grounded. So 
rather than avoid the questions and problems that “speculative” or “trans-empirical” or 
“merely logical” philosophy has traditionally entertained, Lasswell and McDougal land 
precisely in the middle of the problematique. See id. Little goes on to find the Kantian 
solution to this conundrum more successful than the NHS’s evasion of the question alto-
gether. See id. at 458–60. 
380 See Morton White, Essays and Reviews in Philosophy and Intellectual His-
tory 155 (1973) (critiquing the Deweyan naturalist view of value and ethics). 
381 See id. at 156. 
382 See id. at 157. 
383 Id. at 160. 
384 See id. at 160–61. 
385 Id. at 159–60. 
386 See White, supra note 380, at 160. 
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is really red,” then it is hard to see how “X is desirable” is more than “X is 
desired.”387 Stated another way, “X is really red” if looked at under nor-
mal conditions does not mean “X ought to look red” in a moral sense, 
and nor does “X is desirable” if looked at under normal conditions.388 
So if “X is desirable” is no more de jure than “X is desired,” Dewey has not 
succeeded in showing how “desirable” could mean “ought to be de-
sired.”389 
 In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey seeks to establish the possibility of 
scientific verification not just for what is desirable, but also for what 
ought to be desired.390 Just as “normal conditions,” which Dewey some-
times calls “laboratory conditions,” are the testing platform for attribut-
ing any characteristics to objects, the desired can be equated with the 
desirable only under certain ascertainable conditions (whether of a so-
ciological or circular character is unclear). Likewise, Lasswell, and by 
way of intellectual association, McDougal, considers the desired values 
of human dignity to be what ought to be the normative goal of a juris-
prudence for any democratic society, with the addition of a further de-
fect that, despite fervent claims to the contrary, policy science falls 
short of offering any evidence to ascertain the desired in the first 
place.391 Some object to the universalizing claims of the NHS, arguing 
that the parochial nature of its democratic values of human dignity re-
flects American values,392 but this concern should be secondary to the 
greater imperfection of assuming, rather than establishing, consensus, 
or the possibility thereof, about the desirable, whether domestically or 
on the international level.393 
                                                                                                                      
 
387 See id. 
388 See id. 
389 See id. at 161. 
390 See id. at 155–56. 
391 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 91 (postulating human dignity as a desired value without regard to derivation or justifi-
cation). 
392 See, e.g., A.R. Blackshield, The Policy Science Approach to Jurisprudence: A Cri-
tique of the Legal and Sociological Concepts of Lasswell and McDougal 8 (Australian Soc’y 
of Legal Philosophy, Working Paper No. 5, (1964)). 
393 In this respect, compare Lasswell’s view of values with another behaviorist, Paul 
Kecskemeti. In contrast to Lasswell, Kecskemeti, attentive to the complexity of reaching 
consensus on “higher values” in any social setting, also seeks the possibility of rational con-
sensus. So far as values are concerned, however, he rejects that such a consensus could be 
based on strictly scientific grounds. The alternative for Kecskemeti is not the rejection of a 
rational value discourse, but rather to suggest that those engaged in a discourse on “higher 
values” inevitably adopt certain postulates to serve as the framework for subsequent dis-
course. What is important, however, is that according to Kecskemeti, the rejection of such 
postulates does not involve a logical contradiction or a factual error. Nevertheless, it has 
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 It is a faith in “human perfectibility” and in the propitious poten-
tial of the progressive age that draws policy science to the promotion of 
human dignity: 
By taking human dignity as our central focus, we are in step 
with the ideal values of the American tradition, and with the 
progressive ideologies of our epoch. Liberalism and socialism 
are united in affirming the free man’s commonwealth as a 
goal of human society. That man’s dignity is not to be realized 
in this world is the principal forecast of whoever takes a dim 
view of human perfectibility.394 
 This view of human perfectibility, as Bernard Crick agrees, sets 
Lasswell apart from both the natural law tradition or “the self-evident 
propositions of 1776.”395 Those who possess “a dim view of human per-
fectibility” are considered “moral mavericks.”396 The problem is that 
Lasswell and McDougal do little to show that “moral mavericks” empiri-
cally may not outnumber the enlightened optimists. 
 It appears that while Dewey’s natural view of values and ethics suf-
fers from a genuine flaw in moving from “desired” to “ought to be de-
sired,” and is thus unable to provide a sufficient ground for values, 
Lasswell’s presentation of values as mere preferences tries to temporarily 
evade the problem of the justification of normativity.397 To shape pref-
erences such that certain events are viewed as what ought to be desired 
is left to the field of individual and social psychology, as Lasswell’s atten-
tion to the role of propaganda manifests. The obligation of goal clarifi-
cation incumbent on the scholar or decision-maker is a deep psycho-
analytical exercise to clarify all dispositional and environmental ele-
                                                                                                                      
the “stringent consequence” that the agnostic cannot meaningfully participate in the social 
setting that the standard defines. Neither the details of Kecskemeti’s argument, nor the 
flaws plaguing that argument are of importance here. What distinguishes Kecskemeti’s 
view of values from that of Lasswell’s, despite their shared behaviorism, is that Kecskemeti 
believes it is possible to achieve a consensus on “higher values,” even though the condi-
tions of that discourse cannot be closely checked by scientific criteria. See generally Paul 
Kecskemeti, Meaning, Communication, and Value (1952). 
394 Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Time, supra note 250. 
395 Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics, Its Origins and Conditions 
196 (1959). Earlier in the same volume, Crick is hesitant to reject the possibility of a “contin-
ued implicit” adherence to the tradition of “natural rights” by Lasswell. See id. at 192. 
396 See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 212. 
397 See White, supra note 380, at 160; McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, su-
pra note 157, at 189. 
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ments that make up the aggregate objectives that are pursued in deci-
sion-making.398 
 Lasswell’s individualism and reliance on psychology aside, in the 
post-philosophical framework of policy science, the NHS’s values in 
practice do not epistemically live up to the verification standards of 
empirical science, and thus remain non-cognitive. The other contem-
plative and manipulative methods of New Haven’s problem-solving in-
quiry—presented as intellectual tasks for a policy-oriented jurispru-
dence—do little more to address the epistemic status of postulated 
goals. The NHS instead carries out these tasks in a manner that best 
reinforces the value postulates of human dignity. 
B. Trend Thinking 
 The problem-solving approach here is a historical one. The study 
focuses on past trends towards or away from postulated goals to system-
atically understand how past practices have approximated those 
goals.399 The policy-oriented international lawyer bears a great respon-
sibility to use “a comprehensive cognitive map”400 in order to avoid any 
impressionistic or anecdotal use of the past “in terms of isolated tidbits 
of doctrine and practice.”401 This is in fact a methodological tool that, 
in a naturalistic view of values, could at least provide historical proof for 
“the desired.” It could also test the continuity of the “desired” events or 
preferences (and as such their desirability, albeit without establishing 
any de jure status more than the historical continuity of the demand): 
“Having postulated the overriding goal of human dignity on the most 
inclusive possible scale, the principal questions to be answered are 
whether values are becoming more abundant and more widely shared, 
and whether institutional practices are more or less well-adapted to the 
requirements of the fundamental objective.”402 
 The recommended historical approach seems in theory to avoid 
the two extremes of historical pitfalls: the objectivity mirage and the ex-
ile to the island of pure subjectivity. Lasswell and McDougal are clear 
that the policy relevance of trend thinking is that “trend knowledge dis-
closes the degree of congruence or discrepancy between preference and 
                                                                                                                      
398 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 189. 
399 See, e.g., Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 15. 
400 See id. 
401 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 
36–37. 
402 2 id. at 787. 
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fact.”403 But the inquirer nevertheless consciously carries a myriad set of 
preferences into the reconstruction of facts depending on context.404 
 McDougal’s operationalization of trend thinking, which is largely 
presented in the context of human rights, however, leaves much to be 
desired in objectivity. A Marxist reading of McDougal’s description of 
the development of human rights in connection with the culture of 
cities, for instance, reveals the frailty of his historical claim.405 His pro-
gressive reading of the history of urban life and “the respect revolution” 
happily concludes with a hymn that “in the interdependent urbanizing 
globe, the continual reclustering of conditioning factors has had the 
net effect of moving the world community towards articulating and at-
taining the principles of a respect revolution in the name of human 
dignity and an international public and civic order of human rights.”406 
Chimni exposes McDougal’s simplistic portrayal of the “respect revolu-
tion” as the contribution of capitalism and its total disregard for the 
unequal distributive effect of colonialism and neo-colonialism.407 
 It is worth emphasizing that to concur with critiques of McDou-
gal’s actual performance of trend thinking does not mean that a disci-
plined historical inquiry would respond to the need for a firm epis-
temic basis for the normative values at the center of a policy-oriented 
jurisprudence. It merely, and primarily, suggests that given the lack of 
empirical grounds for values in demand in Yale’s jurisprudence, proper 
                                                                                                                      
403 Id. 
404 Some students of the NHS are at times clear on this point: 
[O]bjectivity cannot be achieved by simply collecting facts and presuming 
that they speak for themselves. Facts are not events; they are often the conclu-
sions the observer has drawn from observing events. How the observer collects 
the facts necessary for his inquiry and how he establishes the causal relation-
ship among them cannot be answered without some preconceptions as to the 
events he is observing and the goals he seeks. 
Suzuki, supra note 5, at 15. 
405 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 127–28. 
406 See McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 427–28. 
407 Chimni, supra note 151, at 128. Chimni quotes a passage from Ronald Dworkin, 
that “the pragmatist will pay whatever attention to the past as is required by good strategy,” 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 162 (1986), to attribute the New Haven’s manipulative 
treatment of history to pragmatism. See Chimni, supra note 151, at 128. Such a view of 
pragmatism is merely as simplistic as McDougal’s performance of historical inquiry. It 
would take us too far afield to elaborate on pragmatism and historical inquiry. It suffices 
here to mention that Chimni’s reading of Dworkin is out of context, as Dworkin’s opposi-
tion to pragmatism is here limited to legal interpretation. 
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historical inquiry can only scrutinize to what degree those demands 
have been “approximated.” 
C. Scientific Thinking 
 All of the contemplative and manipulative intellectual tasks of pol-
icy science facilitate the realization of the postulated goals. They are 
integrative, in that they are not marked by any order of priority or strict 
lines of division. The recommended scientific method of analyzing 
conditioning factors is to enrich the description of trends by eliminat-
ing the possibility of mere happenstance and establishing warranted 
causation between past decisions and preferences.408 It is incumbent on 
the inquirer here to define a clear “observational standpoint” with re-
gards to any social process in context.409 Defining an observational 
standpoint does not mean for the intellectual to passively situate one-
self in one’s surroundings, but rather, requires that she adopt a con-
scious social position with regard to those surrounding elements.410 It is 
vital for the legal scholar to be able to travel between an external and 
an internal standpoint.411 When engaged with “theory about law,” it is 
essential for the scholar to take distance from participants in the legal 
process under investigation, and when studying “theories of law” to 
look with the view of a participant observer.412 
 McDougal’s sharp demarcation between the external and internal 
positions sets him apart not only from positivists,413 but also from Lon 
Fuller’s sympathizing observer with professional participants,414 from 
Max Weber’s sociologist who should define an outside standing lest 
“the juristic precision of judicial opinions . . . be impaired” if sociologi-
cal, ethical, or economic grounds were to replace “legal concepts,”415 
from Eugene Ehrlich’s Professor of Law who inevitably brings “norms 
                                                                                                                      
408 See McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 206. 
409 See id. at 199. 
410 See id. 
411 See id. at 200. 
412 See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Trends in Theories About Law: 
Maintaining Observational Standpoint and Determining the Focus of Inquiry, 8 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1; 
McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 199–200. 
413 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 74 (describing exclusive focus on officials and state actors as “the fatal weakness of the 
positivist approach”). 
414 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 106–07 (1964). 
415 Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 11 (Max Rheinstein et al. eds., 
1968). 
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that are being taught” into “the science of norms,”416 from Karl Lle-
wellyn’s jurisprudential work addressed to the “individual case” as op-
posed to the sociologist who addresses himself to the “comforting 
sweep of the decades,”417 and from the later Llewellyn who attempts to 
“bridge between sociology and the legal.”418 The difference lies in the 
fact that McDougal wishes to break the legal professional image by as-
signing an external observer role to the scholar of enlightenment as 
she draws on the trend of past decisions and employs the tools of social 
science to study empirically the causal relationship of those decisions 
and preferred events.419 This is one step further from most realists,420 
who in the latter life of legal realism were concerned with maintaining 
a balance within the professional outlook of the law—Llewellyn’s 
reckon-ability being one such attempt.421 
 If McDougal targets the internal professional image of the law, 
however, he replaces it with another professional image—the profes-
sional image of the policy science scholar of enlightenment.422 The 
modesty of objectivity that McDougal expects to infuse into the exter-
nal observational standpoint is not only apparent in his own admission 
to the presence of identity attachments in any detached scholar,423 but 
                                                                                                                      
 
416 Eugene Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 364 (1936). 
417 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 6 (1960). 
418 Karl Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Meth-
od, 49 Yale L.J. 1355, 1356 (1940). 
419 Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 362, 379–83 (1970) [hereinafter McDougal & Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About 
Law]. 
420 An exception is Bingham, whose views in this regard parallel those of McDougal. 
See, e.g., Joseph W. Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912). 
421 See generally Llewellyn, supra note 417, at 178–208 (exploring the limits and laws 
of ideas that can be reckoned through reason). My analysis of the difference between 
McDougal’s approach and other jurisprudential approaches on the question of observa-
tional standpoint here closely follows that of William Morison. See Morison, supra note 23, 
at 5–13. 
422 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 369 (defining role of scholar in terms of “professional responsibility”). 
423 For example, McDougal addressed the Law of the Sea Institute as follows: 
In these remarks, I shall be speaking as a professor, somewhat pedantically 
lecturing you; this is my vocation, it is my style. I assure you that I do this with 
no arrogance, but in all humility. Similarly, I cannot divorce myself from the 
fact that I am a United States national. I do not think any healthy man can es-
cape identifying with his own national community, as well as with larger 
communities of which it is a member. I have deep roots in the communities of 
many of you here today. I have taught students from other countries, both at 
my home and abroad, for over thirty years. Insofar as I can, I intend to try to 
deal with these problems from the perspectives of citizens of the larger whole 
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also in the fact that the legal scholar as the policy scientist of democracy 
is first and foremost expected to define his standpoint with regards to 
value goals of human dignity before the scientific task begins.424 Main-
taining a credible observational standpoint is as commendable as it is 
difficult, if there is an overbearing commitment to some postulated 
values that distinguish policy scientists of democracy from those of tyr-
anny. The NHS sets up the scholar for the impossible task of maintain-
ing an objective observational standpoint, while it simultaneously urges 
fidelity to some normative commitments in the form of postulates on 
the international lawyer of human dignity. 
D. Developmental Thinking 
 Once the historical and scientific investigations clarify the past 
trend of events and the formation and distribution of values, the schol-
ar performs a projective task to hypothesize the probable future 
trends.425 This is a detailed analytical exercise in which the policy scien-
tist examines the change, continuity, or orderly fluctuation of factors to 
predict an identifiable trend and, accordingly, tailor policy decisions 
toward the realization of predicted future events and preferences.426 
Lasswell develops an intellectual tool called “developmental construct” 
to address the projective task.427 Such a prediction of realistic possibili-
ties is necessary for the performance of the policy scientists’ more crea-
tive responsibility to manipulate the course of events toward the pre-
ferred social vision.428 
 Developmental inquiry, Lasswell’s debt to Marx, nonetheless bears 
no deterministic implications. The policy scholar of enlightenment 
projects a future based on the empirically established trends of the 
                                                                                                                      
of mankind. If you prefer, let us adopt the perspectives of the anthropologist 
who tries to observe both common and special interests and to clarify a com-
mon interest. If I fail in this, I would suggest that this is an exercise which all 
of us should be continually trying. 
Myres S. McDougal, Commentary, in The Law of the Sea, supra note 34, cited in Tipson, 
supra note 31, at 232. 
424 See McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 90–91. 
425 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 68. 
426 Cf. id. at 67–68 (utilizing the Marxist model of social progress to predict and influ-
ence future development). 
427 See id. at 67. 
428 See id. at 68–69. 
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past.429 On one extreme, there is the optimistic construct with increas-
ing interdependence, advancement of science and technology, and 
clarification and promotion of human dignity by intellectuals, while on 
the other extreme there is the garrison state, increasing militarization, 
concentration of wealth, erosion of individual liberties, and the con-
centration and censoring of information.430 These extremes are consis-
tent with the postulated normative vision of the NHS and are not war-
ranted by the results of New Haven’s deficient historical and scientific 
methods of inquiry.431 Thus, the projective task is merely a blithely con-
venient affirmation of the envisioned worldview of policy science, albeit 
alluringly cloaked in scientific fallibilism. 
E. Alternative Thinking 
 Because Lasswell, and thus McDougal, eschew a deterministic view 
of history, they equip the policy scientist with proper tools to manipulate 
events, should the projected future, despite all warranting evidence, ap-
pear unrealistic.432 This is a manipulative and integrative task with a goal 
to maximize effectiveness with minimum dislocation.433 In “integrative” 
solutions, all participants gain, and thus conflicts among potential losers 
would be avoided.434 One of the techniques to foster realism together 
with creativity is to manipulate (shape or modify) the perspectives of the 
people of the world for an accelerated achievement of the objectives of 
the world public order of human dignity: “It is hardly a novel insight 
that the factors—culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis—which 
importantly condition peoples’ perspectives can be modified to foster 
constructive rather than destructive perspectives.”435 
 Aside from the naivety embedded in the assumption about a situa-
tion in which the distribution of the maximum would leave no losers, 
                                                                                                                      
429 McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, at 
92–93. 
430 Id. at 438–39. 
431 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 134–36 (providing more specific examples of McDou-
gal’s simplistic projection of the future); cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World 
Public Order, supra note 356, at 438–39 (assuming, in the optimistic construct, that scholars 
will continue to advance human dignity). 
432 See McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 92–93. 
433 See id. at 93. 
434 Cf. McDougal & Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, supra note 419, at 392 (ad-
vocating integrative solutions to maximize gains and minimize losses). 
435 McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, at 
443. 
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even judged from the standpoint of the underlying economic premises 
of Lasswell’s maximization postulate,436 and the elitist implications of 
policing perspectives through the creative intelligence of intellectuals, 
the realistic view that may be gained as a result of the failure of the ini-
tial “developmental construct” does not alter the unrelenting reign of 
the unjustified values of human dignity.437 Failing the scholar’s pro-
jected view of the future, she does not take a step back to reevaluate the 
desirability of the postulated values, but rather persists to homogenize 
the perspectives of the public (or rather those of the decision-making 
elites) in a therapeutic manner.438 Meanwhile, in practice, the postu-
lated goals of the dignity of man curb any potential methodological 
significance that historical and scientific tasks might bear for a more 
realistic policy-oriented approach. The rigid application of human dig-
nity consistent with the values of the New Haven masters fatally neutral-
izes any emancipatory opportunities that developmental and alterna-
tive thinking could provide to change the status quo. 
Conclusion 
 This Article presents a new understanding of the New Haven Ju-
risprudence and a novel assessment of its pragmatist promises. The 
NHS, the most creative project of disciplinary renewal in the mid-
twentieth century, is like the elephant under the touch of men in the 
dark. Yale’s policy-oriented international law has been understood, inter 
alia, to legitimize U.S. imperialism and to cause the demise of law, to be 
no more than pseudo-scientific jargon, and to represent pragmatist 
thinking in international law. One commentator refuses to recognize 
the NHS as jurisprudence, but nevertheless states that an understand-
ing of modern international law scholarship depends upon an under-
standing of Yale’s policy science.439 
 Critical and admiring reactions to the NHS implicitly or explicitly 
identify Yale’s policy thinking with American pragmatism. Explicit ac-
counts of New Haven’s pragmatism number only a handful and their 
analyses are both mistaken about pragmatism and unfair to Yale’s so-
phisticated configurative jurisprudence. Instead of presenting a scheme 
                                                                                                                      
436 See, e.g., Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 18–20 (as-
suming that individuals seek to maximize their values by utilizing institutions that affect 
resources to achieve preferred outcomes). 
437 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, 
at 90–91 (basing explicitly their analysis in human dignity as a promoted goal). 
438 See id. at 439–40; 443–44. 
439 See Leiter, supra note 21, at 379. 
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of philosophical markers of pragmatism, this Article examines two cen-
tral pragmatist claims of the NHS and assesses their pragmatist poten-
tial in light of the dominant, determinative role of postulates of human 
dignity in legal decision-making. The central argument is that the 
NHS’s antifoundationalism reverts to a foundationalism of its own as it 
grants an over-determining role for legal outcomes to a set of values 
parochial to the New Haven masters. In doing so, Lasswell and McDou-
gal’s foundationalist antifoundationalism fatally blunts New Haven’s 
promises of contextualism and problem-solving creativity. 
 Understanding New Haven’s foundationalist pragmatism in light 
of the internal dynamic between values of human dignity and promises 
of contextualism and problem-solving orientation enables us to see be-
yond the fog of the accusations of the NHS’s legitimization of power or 
affinity with natural law. It also opens the door for a more nuanced ap-
preciation of philosophical pragmatism and its possible contribution to 
policy thinking in international law in the twenty-first century. 
 Whether the NHS adopted American pragmatism and impaired its 
antifoundationalism with a normative foundationalism of its own, or 
the tradition of pragmatism itself has never entirely escaped founda-
tionalism is a historical question beyond the scope of this paper. Once 
we acknowledge the inherently contradictory nature of New Haven’s 
foundationalist pragmatism, however, we are in a position to evaluate 
the career of the policy-oriented approach and its promises for policy 
creativity more accurately and with sympathy. 
